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EFFICIENT DEFINITION AND COMMUNICATION 
OF PATENT RIGHTS: THE IMPORTANCE OF EX 
POST DELINEATION 
William R. Hubbardt 
Abstract 
As with any area of law, rights and duties relating to patents 
should be clearly communicated in an efficient manner. 
Unfortunately, uncertainty concerning the scope of the rights granted 
by patents frequently results in expensive litigation. Most proposals 
for reducing this uncertainty do not examine its root causes and focus 
only on measures to provide additional clarification in patent 
applications. Such ex ante proposals are often inefficient because 
considerable uncertainty is inherent, given the limits of language and 
of our ability to foresee future developments. In addition, ex ante 
clarification often would be wasteful because so few patents are 
valuable enough to be contested. Therefore, ex post clarification of 
patent scope after potentially infringing activities have occurred 
would be more efficient than efforts to clarify exclusively through ex 
ante measures. More specifically, two ex post techniques should be 
adopted. First, courts should recognize that patents often cannot 
communicate ex ante the scope of patent rights and should adjust 
certain patent law doctrines accordingly. Second, an administrative 
procedure should be established to cheaply clarify patent scope after 
a patent has issued. 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING THE SCOPE OF 
PATENTS 
In many respects, patents comport with traditional notions of 
property.l Patents can be owned, bought, sold, and licensed. Patents 
can also be incredibly valuable assets, as shown by high-profile patent 
t William Hubbard is an attorney in the intellectual property litigation group at Alston 
& Bird LLP in Atlanta, Georgia. The views expressed in this article are my own, and not those 
of Alston & Bird or its clients. I thank Henry Smith of Yale Law School and Pat Flinn of Alston 
& Bird for their insightful comments and suggestions. 
I. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("It is beyond 
reasonable debate that patents are property."). 
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litigation like the dispute between NTP and Research In Motion 
(RIM) regarding RIM's Blackberry email service, which resulted in a 
612.5 million dollar settlement following a finding of patent 
infringement.2 Such settlements (and similar judgments) occur 
because patents confer rights to exclude people from undertaking 
commercial activities that may be lucrative.3 This feature of patents 
further justifies an understanding of patents as a form of "property," 
as the right to exclude has been termed "the very definition of 
'property. ",4 Unfortunately, this similarity has important limits. With 
physical property, it is relatively straightforward to determine the 
"thing" that is possessed and owned,5 and this ease of determination 
facilitates the identification of the factual scenarios in which the right 
of exclusive possession applies.6 For example, to determine whether 
someone has trespassed on a parcel of land, an owner need only 
discover whether that person crossed a boundary of the property, 
which typically is a simple process.7 With patents, however, it is often 
hard to determine the thing" that is owned and thus hard to identify 
the "boundaries" delimiting the contexts in which the right to exclude 
applies. As a result, determining the scope of a patent is a critical step 
in any negotiation for the license or sale of patent rights or in any 
patent lawsuit. 8 Indeed, many patent infringement cases settle after 
2. Ian Austen, BlackBerry Service to Continue, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 4, 2006, at Cl. 
3. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000) ("[W]hoever ... makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any 
patented invention ... infringes the patent."). Injunctive relief, however, is not automatically 
awarded for patent infringement. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, Inc., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006). 
4. Carl Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983); e.g., 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) ("The power to 
exclude has traditionally been considered one of the treasured strands in an owner's bundle of 
property rights.") 
5. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 
83 (1985) (discussing the difficulty of "possessing" patentable ideas). 
6. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L. & 
Econ. 265, 276 (1977) ("Unlike fisheries, public roads, and other types of goods usually 
considered, technological information can be used without signaling that fact to another."). 
7. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE LJ. 1315, 1327-28 (1993) 
(describing the reduction in monitoring costs produced by clear boundaries); William R. 
Hubbard, Note, Communicating Entitlements: Property and the Internet, 22 YALE L. & POL'y 
REV. 401, 404-05 (2004). 
8. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, M'D LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46 (2008); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The 
Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminacy, and Interpretation at the Federal Circuit, 58 
HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1025 (2007); Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 
38 RUTGERS LJ. 61, 68 (2006) (describing claim construction as "the most important step in 
any patent litigation"). 
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the court determines the scope of the patent, even if infringement 
itself has not yet been decided.9 
Because determining the scope of a patent before resorting to 
litigation is not only important but also fraught with potential 
uncertainty, it is tempting to try to reduce uncertainty by using 
analogies to concepts applicable to traditional property. However, 
when determining boundaries, the analogies between patents and 
traditional notions of property rights become less useful and 
potentially misleading. Lacking the tangible corpus of traditional 
property, the scope of a patent is largely determined by reference to 
the written patent document, particularly the patent's "claims," which 
are numbered sentences at the end of the patent (and the patent 
application before the patent issues) that "particularly point[] out and 
distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his 
invention."JO While interpreting these claims to determine the scope 
of patent protection, courts often liken them to the "metes and 
bounds" of a parcel of land. II Construing the claims may be 
straightforward in instances where the patent claims, when 
understood through accepted rules of interpretation, clearly 
communicate that a set of facts is covered by the patent. 12 Often, 
however, patent claims are open to conflicting interpretations, each of 
which is reasonable. 13 In such cases, the "metes and bounds" analogy 
is a legal fiction that is, at best, unhelpful and, at worst, misleading. 
Because of the importance of determining the scope of patents, 
courts and commentators consider scope uncertainty to be a serious 
9. See Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim 
Construction, 59 FLA. L. REV. 333,337 & n.21 (2007); Osenga, supra note 8, at 69; Christopher 
A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 
WM. & MARY L. REv. 49, 70-71 & n.99 (2005). 
10. 35 U.S.c. § 112 (2000); see infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. 
II. See infra note 149. 
12. See infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text; cf H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF 
LAW 130 (2d ed. 1994) ("Legal theory has in this matter a curious history; for it is apt either to 
ignore or to exaggerate the indeterminacies oflegal rules."). 
13. Osenga, supra note 8, at 64; see also Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and 
Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction 
Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175,205-08 (2001) (discussing the unpredictability of claim 
construction). In fact, the extent to which the Patent Office requires adjustment to the text of 
patent claims during the application process heavily depends upon which patent examiner is 
working on the patent, indicating that different patent examiners interpret patent claims 
differently. See Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
lSI, ISS, 170(2004). 
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problem that must be remedied through legal reform. I4 Many argue 
that patent applications should be required to contain additional 
information regarding the claimed inventions. IS This article argues 
that these proposed enhancements before a patent issues are 
misguided. Certainly, some patents can be improved. Patentees may 
sometimes be strategically unclear or just sloppy. But a certain 
amount of uncertainty is often unavoidable, or even desirable, for at 
least three reasons. I6 First, uncertainty regarding patent scope often 
stems from the indeterminacy inherent in any effort to describe, with 
words, the full scope the patentee's inventive contribution. Even if the 
patentee were to include additional information regarding the 
invention, substantial uncertainty would persist. Second, for a variety 
of good reasons, patents must be broadened beyond the specific 
details of the discovery of the inventions covered by the patents. 
Implicit broadening is inherently unclear, and even explicit 
broadening engenders uncertainty because broad claim terms are 
likely to be indeterminate. Third, even if some uncertainty could be 
removed by requiring patent applicants to provide more robust 
information regarding patent scope, it is often inefficient to do so. As 
the Supreme Court stated long ago, "[t]he specification and claims of 
a patent, particularly if the invention be at all complicated, constitute 
one of the most difficult legal instruments to draw with 
accuracy .... ,,17 Drafting patents is hard, and the benefits from many 
proposed additional requirements likely do not justify the costs 
involved. 
Part II of this article describes, in general terms, the costs and 
benefits that arise in communicating the scope of property rights in 
general and of patent rights in particular. Part III discusses important 
sources of uncertainty in communications regarding patent scope and 
14. See, e.g., BESS EN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 19; Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim 
Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
1033, 1033-35 (2007); Lefstin, supra note 8, at 1026; Mullally, supra note 9, at 350; F. Scott 
Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-
Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REv. 55, 110 (2003) (contending that patentees should "simply 
draft[] a better patent disclosure at the outset"); see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, 
Inc., 52 FJd 967, 978-79 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (contending that judges should determine 
the "true and consistent scope of the patent owner's rights"), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
15. See infra notes 198-199 and accompanying text. 
16. Bender, supra note 13, at 209 ("Before proposing a solution to the Markman problem, 
we need to understand why uncertainty and unpredictability exist in claim construction."); see 
also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 53 (lamenting the use of "vague" words in patents); cf 
Hubbard, supra note 7, at 406 n.28 (noting that "intellectual property sometimes lacks clear 
boundaries"). 
17. Topliffv. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892). 
2009] IMPORTANCE Of "EX POST PATENT DHINATION 331 
the ways these sources of uncertainty limit the utility of analogizing 
the clarification of a patent's scope to the clarification of real property 
boundaries, contract terms, or statutory language. Part III also argues 
that it is inefficient to improve communications regarding the scope 
of all patents through lengthier, more detailed patent applications 
because the vast majority of patents have no value. Relying on the 
earlier discussions of the reasons for uncertainty in patent scope, Part 
IV argues that clarifying the scope of patents after they have issued is 
more efficient than attempting to fully define scope ex ante. This Part 
recommends that certain patent law doctrines be adjusted to reflect 
the need for some ex post clarification. Moreover, because ex post 
clarification cannot be eliminated, efficiency is promoted by making 
such ex post delineation cheaper. This Part therefore recommends 
expanding current administrative procedures before the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to provide for cheap 
clarification of patent scope. Part V concludes by summarizing this 
article's analysis and proposals. 
II. COMMUNICATING RIGHTS 
A. General Considerations 
Property law controls the legal relations between various actors 
by granting owners rights and imposing correlative duties on others. 18 
For example, the owner of a parcel of land has the right to limit, to a 
considerable degree, who may enter the parcel, when they may enter 
it, and what they may do while on the property. For property rights to 
have any effective meaning, their parameters must be communicated 
to owners, to duty holders, and to authorities. 19 Indeed, because the 
essence of property rights is their capacity to impact the behavior of 
the holders of rights and duties, these rights are substantially defined 
18. Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465,468 
(2004); see Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. 1105, 1117 (2003); see, e.g., WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL 
CONCEPTIONS AS ApPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 36-38 (Walter W. Cook ed., 1964) 
(discussing rights and duties in terms of fundamental correlative relationships). In contrast, tort 
law imposes duties on property owners-for example, the duty of care owed to entrants on an 
owner's or tenant's land. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 232-38 (2000). 
19. This article addresses property rights and not general human rights. Though some 
rights may be considered "self evident," the identification and communication of such rights is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
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by their communication.2o In other words, a "right" that cannot be 
communicated is hardly a right at al1.21 
All communication, including communication regarding 
property rights, entails costs, including both the costs required to 
communicate successfully and the losses resulting from failed 
communication. Efforts to communicate successfully should therefore 
be limited so that the marginal costs of increased success do not 
exceed the marginal benefits,z2 Because of this efficiency concern, 
some communications costs need not be incurred despite their 
capacity to promote successful communication. For example, owners 
of real property typically are not required to build fences that 
communicate the location of boundaries, even though such fences 
would likely improve communication.23 
Communication requires the drafting and sending of a message 
and interpretation of the message by the recipient.24 Thus, the 
informational content of a communication can be affected by both the 
message and the rules of interpretation, which are often 
communicated independently from the message. In some instances, 
the message contains much information, while rules of interpretation 
inject relatively little additional information. For example, in the 
spoken phrase, "The British soldiers are coming by sea," 
interpretation requires only an understanding of verbal English, 
20. See STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 69-74 (1990) (arguing that 
property requires communication via "physical manifestations"); Long, supra note IS, at 495 
(noting that "[i]information costs loom large in property law generally, and even more so in 
intellectual property"); see also Smith, supra note IS, at 1126 (noting that "[l]aw involves 
communication of information"). 
21. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 3S-39 (rev. ed. 1969) ("[T]he 
attempt to create and maintain a system of legal rules may miscarry in at least eight ways[, 
including] ... a failure to publicize, or at least make available to the affected party, the rules he 
is expected to observe .... "). 
22. See Smith, supra note IS, at IIOS; Hubbard, supra note 7, at 412-13; see also Long, 
supra note IS, at 477-7S, 547-4S (discussing communication costs for patents and copyrights). 
23. Long, supra note IS, at 4S2 (noting that "fences or other such markers indicate 
boundaries in a way that [are] usually easy to interpret"); Hubbard, supra note 7, at 405; see also 
infra note 211 and accompanying text (discussing the use of fencing to improve 
communication). Sometimes, the marginal benefit of requiring fences does exceed the costs, and 
land owners may be required to build fences, such as when their property includes an attractive 
nuisance. See, e.g., Henson ex rei. Hunt v. Inl'l Paper Co., 650 S.E.2d 74, SI n.7 (S.C. 2007) 
("[W]here a landowner defines the borders of his property ... by fence or other barrier, and 
such fence or barrier is of a type that should reasonably be expected to exclude children or to 
place children on notice that their presence is not welcome, recovery for injuries to child 
trespassers should generally be precluded."). 
24. Mullally, supra note 9, at 336 ("[A]ll written documents ... require interpretation to 
give them effect."). 
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something fairly common in the North American colonies. On the 
other hand, interpretation may add substantial information.25 Lanterns 
raised in the Old North Church in Boston convey, by themselves, no 
information regarding British troop movements. American 
revolutionaries needed to understand the detailed and specific rule of 
interpretation of "one if by land, two if by sea" for two lanterns to 
communicate that the British soldiers were coming by sea. Because 
communication involves both messages and rules of interpretation, 
the degree of reliance on one aspect or the other can impact the 
success of communication.26 Therefore, evaluating the efficiency of 
different communication techniques requires consideration of both 
aspects to determine the best coordinated balance between messages 
d I f · . 27 an ru es 0 mterpretatIon. 
Communicating property rights through messages and rules of 
interpretation is particularly difficult for many reasons. For example, 
property rights frequently are complex, and may vary in their effects 
on different classes of people. Complex rules authorize police to enter 
a private owner's real property in circumstances where the general 
population may not. Similarly, different classes of audiences may also 
require different types of messages. A potential buyer may research 
public deeds to learn who owns a lot in order to negotiate for its 
purchase. In contrast, a passing hiker need only know the boundary of 
the parcel; the identity of the owner is not important. Thus, a sign or 
fence is generally sufficient to communicate to hikers. Property rights 
may also apply only in certain places, as with a license to use a 
trademark in one franchise location. Property rights may be limited to 
certain objects, like personal food kept in a communal refrigerator. 
25. FRED I. DRETSKE, KNOWLEDGE AND THE FLOW OF INFORMATION 42-43 (1999). 
26. The author previously described techniques for communicating efficiently by 
focusing on "messages" and "methods." Hubbard, supra note 7, at 402-03. Methods are similar 
to rules of interpretation but broader in that methods also involve the mechanism for 
transmitting a message. For example, colonial Bostonians used a message ("one" or "two") and 
rules of interpretation ("one ifby land, two ifby sea") as well as an effective method (the use of 
lanterns to communicate quickly over a long distance). Efficient communication requires 
consideration of all aspects of the exchange of information. 
27. Perhaps the simplest combination of messages and rules of interpretation arises with 
usufructuary rights to public resources, like space on a beach or seats in a movie theater. The use 
of a resource is itself the message. The rule of interpretation is very straightforward: "current 
use allows continued use." Saving seats for a person who is absent is more complicated. One 
seat can clearly be saved, while saving a whole row in a crowded theater would not be 
permitted. Where is the line? Given their simplicity, usufructs arise almost spontaneously in 
novel contexts, such as on-line computer games. See WoW Wiki, 
http://www.wowwiki.comlMining (last visited Nov. 11,2008) (discussing the proper etiquette 
regarding the use ofresources for "mining" in a popular on-line game). 
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Property rights may also impact only certain uses or activities. Zoning 
restrictions, for instance, may prohibit commercial development in a 
residential neighborhood. Despite this complexity, the communication 
of property rights is expected to be constant and consistent over their 
duration, which can last for many years.28 Where the class of duty 
holders for a property right is large and undefined, the entitlement 
must also be communicated to a broad audience. 29 Even if the right 
will affect only a small part of that audience, widespread 
communication may be necessary because it is frequently unclear ex 
ante which potential duty holders will be directly affected. For 
example, real property boundaries are potentially communicated to 
the entire world via publicly recorded deeds, even though only a 
much smaller set of persons actually will interact with a particular 
parcel of land. 
As with any communication, efficiently defining and conveying 
complex entitlements like property rights to recipients requires 
coordination between messages and rules of interpretation. 
Sometimes, the messages provide the bulk of the information 
regarding some aspect of a property right and employ only simple 
translation rules. For example, the physical contours of the space from 
which the owner of a parcel of land can exclude a third party are 
communicated with highly detailed messages-the two-dimensional 
boundaries of the plot of land. Once those boundaries are determined, 
the "ad ceo/urn" principle defines the three-dimensional limits of the 
owners' property rights.3o 
On the other hand, communication may rely less on detailed 
messages and more on rich translation rules. For example, the 
temporal scope of interests in real property has historically been 
limited to five different categories: "the fee simple absolute, the 
defeasible fee simple, the fee tail, the life estate, and the lease.,,31 
These category designations by themselves do not convey much 
information about the legal interests to which they relate. Instead, 
28. MUNZER, supra note 20, at 29, 79 (discussing the importance of expectations and 
property). 
29. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.l. I, 26-27 (2000); Hubbard, supra note 
7,at418. 
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 em!. g (1965) ("Sir Edward Coke once 
gave the utterance to the statement that 'cujus est solum, ejus est usgue ad ceolum,' which, taken 
literally, means that he who owns the soil owns upward unto heaven. This has been repeated in 
many cases .... "); JESSE DUKEMINIER & lAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 133 (4th ed. 1998); 
Smith, supra note 18, at 1116. 
31. Merrill & Smith, supra note 29, at 13; see also Hubbard, supra note 7, at 407-08. 
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each of these categories corresponds to a detailed set of legal 
principles and complicated rules for interpreting these messages (as 
many law students can attest). For example, merely indicating that a 
person owns a "fee simple" does not communicate the temporal scope 
of the property right unless the term "fee simple" is understood.32 
Perhaps for this reason, land owners are largely prevented by 
"numerus clausus" from creating new interests in land.33 Such a new 
interest would require that other owners and third parties learn a new 
rule of interpretation in order to understand the meaning of the new 
legal interest. 34 
Whether detailed messages or robust interpretation rules better 
promote efficient communication may depend upon whether senders 
or receivers are better suited to bear particular communication costS.35 
Requiring more detailed messages raises costs for those who create 
and send them.36 For example, if the law required the boundaries of 
all parcels of land to be identified with fences, owners would incur 
additional costS.37 On the other hand, learning and applying 
interpretation rules requires investment by the recipients of the 
messages.38 This article focuses on efficiency and, thus, on the desire 
to impose communication costs on the parties that can most cheaply 
bear or reduce them.39 Where persons with knowledge can convey 
that information more cheaply than third parties can independently 
discover it,40 ceteris paribus, those with knowledge should be 
required to incur costs to communicate it.41 Similarly, requmng 
32. Moreover, the temporal scopes of some of these categories require further 
explanation, such as the term of the lease. 
33. Merrill & Smith, supra note 29, at 13; Hubbard, supra note 7, at 407. 
34. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The 
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 397 (2002); 
Hubbard, supra note 7, at 410; see also Long, supra note 18, at 468, 546 (noting that "[s]ui 
generis forms of protection raise information costs along one margin-that of comprehending 
legal rules"). 
35. Hubbard, supra note 7, at 423. 
36. Smith, supra note 18, at 1132 (noting that a "shorter message is cheaper to produce"); 
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE LJ. 557, 562-63 
(1992). 
37. Hubbard, supra note 7, at 412. 
38. Smith, supra note 18, at 1108, 1132, 1139; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 34, at 
397; Merrill & Smith, supra note 29, at 8; Hubbard, supra note 7, at 410; see also Long, supra 
note 18, at 468,546 (noting that "[s]ui generis forms of protection raise information costs along 
one margin-that of comprehending legal rules"). 
39. Hubbard, supra note 7, at 423; see also Mullally, supra note 9, at 381 (discussing the 
importance of "properly allocat[ing] burdens" in communicating patent scope). 
40. Hubbard, supra note 7, at 423-27. 
41. Jd. at 423. 
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recipients of messages to learn complicated interpretation rules, like 
the meanings of the different legal interests in real property, promotes 
efficient communication where those rules allow for successful 
communication using cheap, easy-to-produce messages.42 Efficiency 
may also be promoted when communication costs are borne by a 
party that can use messages or rules of interpretation in multiple 
communications and thereby amortize costS.43 For example, although 
a complicated rule of interpretation may be initially expensive to 
create and learn, it may nevertheless promote efficiency if it can be 
applied in a great many communications. Finally, it may be more 
efficient for communications to fail if successful communication is 
not cost effective. 
B. Patent Rights and the Role of Claim Construction 
Like other types of property rights, the details of a patent's scope 
are communicated using messages and rules for interpreting those 
messages. The primary sources of messages regarding patent rights 
are patent applications and the patents themselves.44 An application 
(and subsequently a patent) is comprised of a "specification" that 
"conclude[ s] with one or more claims particularly pointing out and 
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as 
his invention.,,45 The specification contains a detailed description of 
the invention, but the "claims... pointing out... the subject 
matter,,46 are the most important messages regarding patent scope. 
Indeed, these claims are often viewed as defining the "metes and 
bounds" of the patent.47 However, each patent claim typically consists 
of only a single, densely-written sentence.48 Given this relative 
brevity, understanding the meaning of patent claims requires 
substantial interpretation.49 In other words, the communication of a 
patent's scope heavily relies on a system of robust interpretation 
rules. 
42. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 29, at 13. 
43. See Kaplow, supra note 36, at 563; Hubbard, supra note 7, at 427-28. 
44. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 238. 
45. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); see also MUNZER, supra note 20, at 73 (discussing the use of 
the patent specification to communicate the scope of patent rights). 
46. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
47. Cotropia, supra note 9, at 70 (claiming that "[o]nce a claim's meaning is determined, 
the exact location of the patent's metes and bounds are known"); Bender, supra note 13, at 214-
15; Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
COLUM. L. REv. 839, 845 (1990). 
48. Mullally, supra note 9, at 349. 
49. See id. at 336. 
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This system is based on several well-accepted rules of 
interpretation. 50 First, each claim is interpreted in the context of the 
entire patent document, including other claims51 and the other parts of 
the specification. For example, the textual context in which a word is 
used may be considered. 52 Indeed, a patentee is allowed to act as his 
or her own "lexicographer," and thus to imbue a term with an 
idiosyncratic meaning that predominates over the term's ordinary 
meaning. 53 Second, claim interpretation may also take into account 
the record of all of the proceedings before the USPTO leading up to 
the patent's issuance.54 Third, in addition to these intrinsic evidentiary 
sources, the meaning of a word in a claim is based on the "ordinary 
and customary" meaning of the term to a person having ordinary skill 
in the art (often abbreviated "PHOSIT A") relevant to the invention at 
the time of the invention.55 A PHOSITA, however, is defined by "the 
art" and not the words of the patent. Understanding the perspective of 
this idealized audience may require reliance on information separate 
and apart from the history of the patent, such as dictionaries, treatises, 
expert testimony, or other extrinsic sources regarding relevant 
scientific principles and the state of the art. 56 
To some extent, patent law requires the use of claims in order to 
foster greater certainty about the scope of patent rights. For example, 
claims are easy to locate, as they always appear at the end of the 
patent. 57 In light of these features, claims are often described as 
providing sufficient "notice" of the scope of patent rights. 58 However, 
this notice is somewhat fictional because claim construction is far 
from being an exact science, and reasonable people often disagree 
regarding the construction of crucial terms. Even though the 
50. See infra notes 102-110 and accompanying text (discussing canons of interpretation 
for patents). 
51. For example, claims can be drafted as either "independent" or "dependent," with 
dependent claims "contain[ing] a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specii)'[ing] 
a further limitation of the subject matter claimed." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). Dependant claims 
thus provide additional clarification to independent claims. 
52. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
53. ld. at 1313; see Joseph Scott Miller, EnhanCing Patent Disclosure for Faithfol Claim 
Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. Rev. 177,204 (2005). 
54. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. 
55. ld. at 1313. 
56. ld. at 1314. 
57. ld. at 1311-12; 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
58. MullalIy, supra note 9, at 334. But see John R. Thomas, Claim Re-Construction: The 
Doctrine of Equivalents in the Post-Markman Era, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 153, 160 (2005) 
(noting that, because of the Doctrine of Equivalents, "it has never been the law that the claims 
provide the entirety of the metes and bounds of the patent rights"). 
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construction of a patent claim often controls the outcome of an 
infringement dispute,59 claim construction is frequently unpredictable. 
The Federal Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review claim 
constructions in cases arising under the patent laws,6o changes district 
court claim constructions in nearly one third of patent cases.61 
Moreover, a substantial number of claim constructions by the Federal 
Circuit issue with dissents. 62 
Unfortunately, uncertainty regarding claim scope in issued 
patents can engender substantial costs and undermine efficient 
innovation.63 An audience reviewing the patent may incorrectly 
construe the patent too narrowly, prompting unintentional 
infringement that otherwise could have been cheaply avoided had the 
infringer correctly understood the patent claims.64 Incorrectly 
interpreting a patent too broadly may also result in inefficiency. 
Fearing infringement, a person may avoid productive activities that 
are not protected by the patent or pay unnecessary royalties to the 
patent owner. Because such royalties foster deadweight loss, they do 
not effectively promote innovation.65 Finally, inefficiency results 
because of the high administrative costs of determining the scope of a 
patent.66 Where it is unclear whether a patentee has construed a patent 
too broadly or whether an alleged infringer has construed it too 
narrowly, this uncertainty often leads to expensive litigation.67 
59. Mullally, supra note 9, at 337. 
60. 28 U.s.c. § 1295 (2000). 
61. Osenga, supra note 8, at 65. 
62. Lefstin, supra note 14, at 1037; Thomas, supra note 58, at 163; see, e.g., Acumed 
LLC v. Stryker Corp., 483 FJd 800,814 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Agfa Corp. v. Creo Prods. Inc., 451 
F.3d 1366, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2006); nCube Corp. v. SeaChange Int'l, Inc., 436 FJd 1317, 1327 
(Fed. Cir. 2006); PhiIlips v. AWH Corp., 415 FJd at 1303, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
63. Mullally, supra note 9, at 335 (noting that "claims play the dispositive role in 
balancing competing interests in the law of invention"); MiIler, supra note 53, at 196; see also 
BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 46 (extolling the benefits of clear notice of property 
boundaries); Long, supra note 18, at 502. 
64. See Mullally, supra note 9, at 366; Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup 
and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2008-10 (2007). A patent examiner could also 
misconstrue the scope of the claims in a patent application and allow an invalid patent to issue 
that may be used to restrict commercially beneficial activities without any concomitant boon to 
innovation. 
65. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 53, at 199; Bender, supra note 13. 
66. Cf GUIDO CALABRESl, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 225-26 (1970) (discussing 
administrative costs). 
67. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 120-38 (discussing the costs of patent litigation). 
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III. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT PROPOSALS TO ADDRESS 
UNCERTAINTY IN COMMUNICATING PATENT SCOPE 
Many scholars have criticized patent law for the uncertainty, and 
associated costs, involved with claim construction.68 Despite this 
widespread criticism, scholars have not adequately addressed the 
sources of this uncertainty or the relative costs of alternatives that 
might reduce it.69 The first omission is important because it is not 
possible to develop workable remedies to reduce uncertainty without 
a proper understanding of its causes.70 For example, comparisons 
between patents and other legal concepts like real property, contracts, 
or statutes may not help to improve communications regarding patent 
scope because patents and other legal instruments involve different 
obstacles to clear communication. The failure to address the relative 
costs and benefits of methods to improve communications regarding 
patent scope results in proposals that fail to appreciate that uncertainty 
is often difficult, if not impossible, to eliminate and that some 
methods to reduce it are better than others. 
A. Textual Sources of Uncertainty 
1. The use of Words in a World of Factual Uncertainty 
A major source of uncertainty regarding the scope of patents is 
that patents are based largely on written words/I which are inherently 
imprecise to a considerable extent. 72 The words of a patent claim are 
68. Mullally, supra note 9, at 343 ("A perceived lack of certainty, in the sense of 
predictability of results (e.g., claim, scope, or meaning), has been the basis for much criticism of 
patent law in general, and claim construction specifically .... " (footnotes omitted)); see, e.g., 
BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 46-72; Thomas, supra note 58, at 165; Cotropia, supra note 
9, at 98-99. Some of the criticism regarding the clarity of claim scope stems from the Federal 
Circuit's inconsistent jurisprudence regarding the proper methodology for construing patent 
claims. In 2005, the Federal Circuit attempted to harmonize its jurisprudence through the en 
banc decision Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The uncertainty 
stemming from inconsistent case law has therefore been largely addressed and is accordingly not 
the subject of this article. 
69. Cf Thomas, supra note 58, at 165 (noting the "industrial uncertainty" in patent scope 
stemming from sources other than indeterminate patent claims). 
70. See a/so Cotropia, supra note 9, at 100 (noting that some commentary "begs the 
question of whether any [claim construction] methodology can produce absolute certainty in 
claim meaning"). 
71. Patents may also be communicated using drawings and samples. 
72. Bender, supra note 13, at 209 ("To some extent, the nature of language and the 
purpose of patent claims make absolute clarity impossible."); see Lawrence M. Solan, Why 
Laws Work Pretty Well, but Not Great: Words and Ru/es in Lega/Interpretation, 26 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 243, 244 (2001); see a/so Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 
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the primary messages by which patent scope is determined and 
communicated, though additional messages about patent scope also 
appear in the specification.73 These messages, along with the accepted 
rules for their interpretation, provide relatively clear core concepts, 
but uncertainty inevitably intrudes at the margins. However, despite a 
wealth of legal scholarship addressing the imprecision of language in 
non-patent contexts, patent-law scholars often fail to recognize this 
inherent obstacle to patent-scope certainty. 
Words are imprecise because, for example, they have multiple 
meanings, and it may not be clear which meaning is intended.74 For 
example, rock may refer to a stone, a type of music, a rocking 
movement, etc. Even when it is clear which meaning of a word a 
speaker intended to use, whether that meaning includes a particular 
concept may be unclear.75 The possible scope of a specific meaning of 
an individual word itself does not have clear linguistic boundaries.76 
Words are often understood as focusing on certain "prototypes" or 
"plain cases.,,77 For instance, "rock", when used to reference stone, 
clearly includes materials like granite, slate, and marble. The further 
that a concept strays from prototypical examples, the more difficult 
the classification becomes.78 As H.L.A. Hart observed, "uncertainty at 
the borderline is the price to be paid for the use of general classifying 
terms in any form of communication concerning matters of fact.,,79 
396 (Ct. CI. 1967) ("The very nature of words would make a clear and unambiguous claim a 
rare occurrence."). 
73. A full discussion of the imprecision oflanguage is beyond the scope of this article. 
74. Dan 1. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK 1. 
REv. 29,40 (2005). 
75. Long, supra note 18, at 506 ("Some degree of ambiguity will be irreducible."). 
76. Solan, supra note 72, at 257 (noting that "concepts have fuzzy boundaries ... [and] 
some examples of words are better than others"). 
77. HART, supra note 12, 126 (noting that there will be "plain case[s for which] the 
general terms seem to need no interpretation and where the recognition of instances seems 
unproblematic or 'automatic' .... "); see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 74, at 32 ("The text of 
patent claims may ... lack[] a sharp outer perimeter, but usually situated [sic] within a particular 
core range of meaning."); Andrew Auchincloss Lundgren, Perspectives on Patent Claim 
Construction: Re-Examining Markman v. Westview Instruments Through Linguistic and 
Cognitive Theories of Decisionmaking, 12 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 173 (2004) (discussing 
prototypical meanings of words); Solan, supra note 72, at 257. 
78. See HART, supra note 12, at 127 (noting that whether a concept satisfies a legal rule 
depends upon "the criteria of relevance and closeness of resemblance"); see also Osenga, supra 
note 8, at 107 (noting that narrow claim constructions based on generally accepted meanings 
provide better notice than meanings that incorporate less widely accepted meanings); see also 
Solan, supra note 72, at 257. 
79. HART, supra note12, at 128; see also Long, supra note 18, at 471 ("Despite the best 
efforts of individuals and the presence of formal and informal rules, property rights remain 
ambiguous around the edges."). 
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For example, in a communication regarding "rocks," it may not be 
clear whether "rock" includes gravel (small rock?), sand (very small 
rock?), chalk dust (very, very small rock?), salt (rock salt?), or cement 
(if shaped, textured, and colored to resemble rock). Moreover, people 
may disagree whether a factual scenario is sufficiently similar to a 
prototype or plain case to fall within the definition of a word. Some 
people, for example, may consider rock salt to be a rock, while others 
do not. Determining whether a word includes a particular factual 
scenario may therefore involve subjective considerations based on 
past experiences.so 
Another reason that patent claims are necessarily unclear stems 
from the difficulty of using words to create laws in a world of factual 
uncertainty.s1 By describing certain activities that can only be 
undertaken with permission from the patentee, patent claims establish 
laws, albeit of limited application. Uncertainty in law stems, in part, 
from what Hart calls the indeterminacy of fact, which reflects our 
ignorance of "all the possible combinations of circumstances which 
the future may bring."s2 When words are assembled to create laws 
(including patent claims), the indeterminacy of fact gives rise to 
another form of uncertainty: "indeterminacy of aim."s3 Because we 
cannot foresee all relevant factual scenarios when we are formulating 
rules, we cannot consider how to treat those unforeseen 
circumstances.84 Although careful word selection and forethought 
may limit indeterminacies to a certain extent, it is unlikely that 
thought and drafting can entirely eliminate them because, as Hart 
80. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 74, at 51; see also Solan, supra note 72, at 263. Dan 
Burk and Mark Lemley have argued that uncertainty in the meaning of patent claims also stems 
from the different ways that words in a claim can be grouped into elements: 
Define an element narrowly-limit it to a single word, say-and you will tend to 
narrow the resulting patent, because to prove infringement the patentee must 
show that each word has a corresponding structure in the accused device. By 
contrast, defining an element broadly tends to broaden the patent, because it 
permits the text to be read on a greater range of accused devices. 
Burk & Lemley, supra note 74, at 30, 44-45. 
81. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 74, at 36 ("Thus, even so-called literal claim 
interpretation occurs at a relatively high level of abstraction, as no text is 'literally' found in the 
claimed invention-only a correspondingly described physical structure."). 
82. HART, supra note 12, at 128; see also Mullally, supra note 9, at 376 ("The transaction 
costs of specifying every possible form of each aspect of the invention, even assuming that they 
can be foreseen, may exceed the gains."); see also Kaplow, supra note 36, at 600 (noting that 
"another limitation on the ability to formulate laws as rules involves limitations oflanguage"). 
83. HART, supra note 12, at 128. 
84. See id. at 129; see also Long, supra note 18, at 512. 
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cautioned, "we are men, not godS.,,85 Rather, uncertainty is typically 
revealed when a new factual scenario arises, and "something in the 
nature of a choice between open alternatives must be made by 
whoever is to resolve them.,,86 
With patents, the uncertainty created by open-textured meanings 
is particularly troubling. Under the Constitution, patents must protect 
the discoveries of inventors. 87 By definition, discoveries and 
inventions often involve changing, cutting-edge technology. 
However, both the future state of that technology and its terminology 
may be unsettled,88 and infringement claims may not be brought until 
years after the patent was issued.89 In addition, the lack of widely 
accepted terminology may prompt a patent applicant to use a word 
unconventionally,90 thereby placing the use of the word well outside 
of familiar prototypes.91 The meanings of words may also fluctuate 
over time as new terminology becomes standardized.92 Indeed, the 
Federal Circuit has warned that "[a] particular term used in one patent 
need not have the same meaning when used in an entirely separate 
patent, particularly one involving different technology.,,93 Moreover, 
infringing devices or processes may not resemble the specific 
invention that gave rise to the patent in the first place.94 Consequently, 
at the time a patent is drafted, it may be particularly difficult to 
85. HART, supra note 12, at 128. Some factual scenarios that appear obvious in retrospect 
may stem more from hindsight bias than foreseeability. Cj KSR Int'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 
S. Ct. 1727, 1742 (2007) (discussing the dangers of hindsight bias when reviewing the 
obviousness of an invention). 
86. HART, supra note 12, at 127. 
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
88. See Osenga, supra note 8, at 66; see also Pharmastem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, 
Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("The courts have recognized, particularly in fields 
of new and evolving knowledge, that the claims can be no more precise than the knowledge in 
the field permits."). 
89. Indeed, through continuation applications, patents may issue years after an 
application was filed. 
90. See Osenga, supra note 8, at 97. 
91. Certain concepts, including the meanings of words, may be more psychologically 
prominent than others-a concept sometimes described as "salience." Smith, supra note 18, at 
1129. Two persons are more likely to consider a meaning salient when they share substantial 
background information. Smith, supra note 18, at 1129. With technologies and terminology in 
flux, such background commonality may be less common, and notions of salience accordingly 
may not encourage different people to interpret patent terms similarly. 
92. See Thomas, supra note 58, at 162-63; see also Smith, supra note 18, at 1181 (noting 
that words do not have constant meanings). 
93. Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. CiT. 2005). 
94. See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in 
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1802 (2007). 
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envlSlon all of the factual scenarios related to infringement in the 
future and thus difficult to decide which of those future scenarios 
should be declared to fall within the scope of the patent.95 In short, the 
indeterminacies of fact and aim are particularly magnified with 
patents.96 
The difficulties with ex ante communication of patent scope are 
increased because of problems with ex ante identification of the 
proper scope of patents. Efficient achievement of the constitutional 
goal of patents-"promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts,,97 -requires that patent scope correlate with the breadth of an 
inventor's discovery.98 Because of the indeterminacies noted above, 
however, the relationship between an invention and later technology 
may not be foreseeable. 99 As a result of the inability to identify patent 
scope ex ante in terms of future technology, scope cannot be 
accurately conceived, much less precisely communicated. No matter 
how detailed or precise an ex ante delineation of patent scope is, that 
scope likely correlates inaccurately with the proper innovation-
promoting scope of the invention. 
95. Cf McCullogh v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 385 (1819) ("How unwise would it have 
been, to legislate immutably for exigencies which had not then occurred, and which must have 
been seen but dimly and imperfectly!"). Indeed, some scholars have suggested that patent law 
needs revision because it allows for the patenting of items and technology that materially differ 
from the "paradigmatic assets" for which patent law was originally designed. Long, supra note 
18, at 470,542. 
96. HART, supra note 12, at 126 (noting that "plain cases" include those that are "familiar 
ones, constantly recurring in similar contexts"). Jeffrey Lefstin has argued that claim 
construction is not particularly indeterminate when compared to other legal issues because the 
incidence of dissent in Federal Circuit opinions addressing claim construction is not 
significantly greater than the rate of dissent in other types of patent-law decisions. Lefstin, supra 
note 14, at 1044. Lefstin does not dispute, however, that claim construction may be somewhat 
indeterminate and instead contends that it is not especially indeterminate in comparison to other 
legal issues. Moreover, certain assumptions that Lefstin made in his study undermine its 
persuasiveness. For example, Lufkin assumes that the likelihood of dissent does not vary 
between issues except based on the indeterminateness of those issues. Judges may, however, be 
more likely to dissent on issues that have effect as precedent, and claim constructions are 
unlikely to be applied in multiple lawsuits. Indeed, Lefstin admits that some of his assumptions 
are "not precise." Lefstin, supra note 8, at 1083-84. A full examination of Lefstin's detailed 
study is beyond the scope of this article. 
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 
F.3d 551, 558 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
98. See Contropia, supra note 9, at 106-07; Long, supra note 18, at 480 (defining the 
novel aspect of an invention as the difference between the invention and the prior art). 
99. Merges & Nelson, supra note 47, at 848 (noting that "no one knows what future 
developments will follow" a patent). 
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2. The Limits of Interpretive Rules 
Like any communication, words in patents require interpretation, 
which may eliminate many potential meanings for many words and 
may help clarify the scope of individual meanings. Interpretation is 
particularly important with patent claims because they are such 
densely written statements. 100 Rules of interpretation, however, suffer 
from their own form of linguistic indeterminacy because they, like the 
messages they are designed to interpret, are communicated and 
implemented through words. lol As with any message, interpretative 
rules may be clear only in typical cases. 
In addition to standard rules of the English language, patent law 
uses context and canons of construction to interpret patent claims. 
These canons include the following: 
1. Patent terms should not be construed contrary to their plain 
. 102 meamng. 
2. Patent terms should have consistent meaning throughout a 
patent. 103 
3. Patentees may be their own "lexicographers" and use terms 
idiosyncratically. 104 
4. Patent terms should not be construed in a manner that renders 
two claims identical in scope. lOS 
5. A claim should not be construed to exclude an embodiment 
disclosed in the specification. 106 
6. Claims should be construed in light of the specification. l07 
7. Limitations in the specification should not be read into the 
claim. 108 
100. Patent claims are typically only a single sentence long. Osenga, supra note 8, at 65. 
101. HART, supra note 12, at 126; see Mullally, supra note 9, at 378. 
102. Mullally, supra note 9, at 352. 
103. Id.; but see Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 520 F.3d 
1367, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that a term used multiple times in a single claim could 
be interpreted inconsistently). 
104. Robert Fram et a!., Claim Construction and Implicit Definitions Based on the 
Specification Since Phillips, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 65 (2007) (describing factors a court may 
consider in determining whether to implicitly limit the scope of claim terms). 
105. Mullally, supra note 9, at 353; Osenga, supra note 8, at 75. 
106. Mullally, supra note 9, at 353; see also Osenga, supra note 8, at 75. 
107. Contropia, supra note 9, at 79 (quoting Slimfoid Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 
810 F.2d 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1987». 
108. Mullally, supra note 9, at 352-53; Osenga, supra note 8, at 75; Contropia, supra note 
9, at 80. 
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Because these canons are vague and often conflict with each 
other, they often do not provide clear guidance on claim 
construction. 109 For example, the role of the specification in 
construing the meaning of a claim term is indeterminate. On the one 
hand, claims should be construed in light of the specification (number 
6 above), and the specification may indicate that a patentee acted as 
his or her own lexicographer and used a term idiosyncratically to be 
narrower than the term is usually defined (number 3 above). On the 
other hand, limitations from the specification should not be read into 
the claims (number 7 above). Reconciling these two canons is a 
challenge because the difference between a "limitation" and an 
idiosyncratic use is far from clear. 110 
Patent interpretation is also complicated by the requirement 
addressed above that claims are to be interpreted from the perspective 
of an idealized audience-a person having ordinary skill in the art 
(PHOSITA). III Developing this viewpoint may require substantial 
information beyond the patent, including the complete prosecution 
history,112 treatises, dictionaries, and expert testimony. Furthermore, 
because a PHOSIT A is considered to have total knowledge of all 
relevant prior art, it will be necessary to identify and to analyze 
relevant prior art. 113 In short, as a result of indeterminacy, there is no 
"rigid algorithm for claim construction,,,114 and "reasonable people 
can[, and often do,] differ" I 15 on the proper scope of a patent. 
Finally, the problems stemming from indeterminacies of 
language are magnified with patents because they are created using 
language. Patentees submit written patent applications to the USPTO, 
109. See Patrick J. Flinn, Towards a Coherent Theory of Patent Claim Interpretation, 
PATENT LITIGATION 2000507,513-14 (2000) (available at West law as 619 PLlIPAT 507); see 
also Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons 
About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395,401 (1950) (arguing that canons 
of statutory construction are indetenninate because for every canon promoting one interpretation 
there is another canon supporting a conflicting construction). Commentators have also noted that 
the Federal Circuit's decisions regarding the proper process for claim construction have been 
inconsistent. See Osenga, supra note 8, at 64. 
110. This conflict is well recognized. See Mullally, supra note 9, at 353; Osenga, supra 
note 8, at 75; Contropia, supra note 9, at 81; Miller, supra note 53, at 205. 
III. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
112. Patent prosecution is the process of applying for a patent and includes various 
administrative procedures of the USPTO. 
113. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 
1986) ("The person of ordinary skill is a hypothetical person who is presumed to be aware of all 
the pertinent prior art."). 
114. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
115. Id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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where they are evaluated by a patent examiner who determines 
whether the application should be granted. I 16 The inherent 
uncertainties of language may allow the examiner and the patentee to 
adopt different claim constructions, with only the examiner's 
construction supporting patentability. The examiner and the patentee, 
however, may be unaware of the differences in their constructions or 
may not create a record of it. 117 Indeed, the patentee may strategically 
include open-ended language that enables the examiner to adopt a 
narrow, valid construction while also allowing the patentee to argue a 
broad, but invalid, construction in a later patent infringement 
dispute. 1I8 Even if the court rejects the patentee's construction, it may 
arrive at a construction different from the examiner and on which the 
examiner would have denied the patent application. 
3. The Need to Broaden Patent Scope Beyond Specific 
Embodiments 
An invention typically will be broader than the particular facts of 
its discovery. For example, an inventor might understand that a nail, 
screw, or staple would be equally appropriate to solve a problem in a 
project, but elect to use a nail 'merely because it was convenient. 
Patent protection should not be limited to using a nail, however, 
because patent scope should be commensurate with the invention's 
contribution to "the Progress of Science and useful Arts," and not 
restricted by decisions based on unrelated criteria, such as 
convenience. 119 This concept is captured in patent law by the 
distinction between inventions and embodiments of that invention. 12o 
The use of a nail is an aspect of one specific embodiment of the more 
general invention, which encompasses the use of a nail, screw, or 
staple. Patentees are required by statute to disclose the best 
116. 35 U.S.C. §§ Ill, 131 (2000). 
117. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 55, 226 (noting that "patent examiners do 
not record their interpretation of the boundaries of the patent"). 
118. See Long, supra note 18, at 506 ("Because one way to reduce th~ costs of agreement 
is to agree on less, patentees and examiners may leave patent language ambiguous so as to reach 
an outcome faster."). Patent examiners generally cannot provide their interpretations of patent 
claims in later infringement litigation. 37 C.F.R. § 104.23 (2007). 
119. See Cotropia, supra note 9, at 106-07 (discussing cases that correlate patent 
protection with the scope of the invention); Long, supra note 18, at 480 (defining the innovative 
contribution of an invention as the difference between the invention and the prior art); Merges & 
Nelson, supra note 47, at 845-48 (noting the importance of patents covering "minor variations" 
on the inventor's work). 
120. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 199. 
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embodiment--called the "best mode"-for practicing the invention. 121 
Patentees are also required to provide sufficient written description of 
the more general invention to demonstrate that it was firmly held 
within the patentee's mind at the time the application was 
submitted. 122 The distinction between the invention and its 
embodiments is also important in claim construction. The Federal 
Circuit has noted that, courts should not "confine their definitions of 
terms to the exact representations depicted in the embodiments" listed 
in the specification. 123 
Thus, in order to correlate patent protection with the scope of the 
invention, patent rights must be broadened beyond the initial 
embodiment that led to the filing of a patent application. 124 Patent law 
provides for implicit and explicit broadening, but both approaches 
engender substantial uncertainty. First, patent scope is implicitly 
expanded through the Doctrine of Equivalents. Literal infringement of 
patent is shown when an accused device or process practices every 
element of a patent claim. 125 The Doctrine of Equivalents, in contrast, 
expands patent protection to devices and process that are technically 
different but substantively equivalent. 126 The doctrine measures 
equivalency element by element and provides that a device or process 
infringes a patent even if the device or process contains elements that 
insubstantially differ from the elements of the patent. 127 Under this 
approach, elements are equivalent if they perform the same function 
121. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
122. See 35 U.S.c. § 112 (2000); see also Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 
1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the written description requirement of § 112 provides that 
the applicant must "convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing 
date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention"). 
123. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
124. Miller, supra note 53, at 184 ("To specify the full range of marketplace conduct that a 
patent claim empowers the patentee to exclude, we confront a tension that arises necessarily 
from trying to grasp the world of things-actual inventions in real space-with words."). 
125. ACCD Brands, Inc. v. Micro Sec. Devices, Inc., 346 F.3d 1075, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
126. See Thomas, supra note 58, at 156 (noting that the Doctrine of Equivalents 
"expand[s] the reach of a patent's claims beyond their literal language"); see also Miller, supra 
note 53, at 185 ("The scope of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead embraces all 
equivalents to the claims described" (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo 
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730-32 (2002))); Lichtman, supra note 13, at 152. 
127. See Thomas, supra note 58, at 157 (discussing the requirement that equivalency be 
measured element by element); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chern. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 
29 (1997). 
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in the same way to achieve the same result. 128 For example, if a patent 
claim described the use of a nail to connect two things, a court might 
find equivalent the use of a screw. 129 Absent this doctrine, competitors 
could avoid infringement through minor changes to the claimed 
invention, like substituting a screw for a nail. 130 Consequently, the 
Doctrine of Equivalents improves the correlation between patent 
scope and the inventor's contribution to "the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts." The Doctrine of Equivalents, however, is an imprecise 
and uncertain means of expanding patent scope because resolving 
disputes regarding whether two different activities should be 
considered "equivalent" often requires litigation. l31 This uncertainty 
places substantial costs on patent audiences, including both the costs 
of attempting to apply the doctrine and the costs from erroneously 
determining the extent to which the doctrine expands a patent beyond 
its literal scope. 132 
The second mechanism for broadening patent scope is that patent 
applicants can explicitly use broad claim terms to correlate patent 
scope with innovation. 133 For example, if an inventor used a nail in 
the initial embodiment of an invention, the inventor might file a 
patent application referencing a "connector" so that it will not be 
128. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 39. The elements of the patent are atomistic 
concepts, and a single claim limitation may contain multiple elements. See, e.g., id. at 32 
(characterizing as a separate "element" a number in range in a phrase in a claim limitation). 
129. Burk & Lemley, supra note 74, at 37. 
130. See Thomas, supra note 58, at 156. 
131. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 61; Thomas, supra note 58, at 156, 169-75; 
Lichtman, supra note 13, at 152; Kieff, supra note 14, at 109-110. 
132. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 61-62; Warner Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29 
("There can be no denying that the doctrine of equivalents ... conflicts with the definitional and 
public notice functions of the statutory claim requirement."); see supra notes 63-67 and 
accompanying text. 
133. Patentees may also use broad, open-textured terms in an attempt to convince an 
examiner to allow a patent to issue, rather than to more accurately describe their invention. 
BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 239; Long, supra note 18, at 506; Bender, supra note 13, at 
210-11. The patent examiner might construe an unclear term in a patent application narrowly so 
that it excludes prior art from the scope of the claims and use this construction to allow the 
patent to issue. BESSEN &. MEURER, supra note 8, at 57 (noting that "patent applicants 
sometimes game the system by drafting ambiguous patent claims that can be read narrowly 
during examination such that they avoid a novelty rejection"); Bender, supra note 13, at 190. 
Although a patent examiner has a duty to evaluate a draft claim in a patent application using the 
broadest reasonable interpretation, Springs Window Fashions LP v. Novo Indus., L.P., 323 F.3d 
989,995 (Fed. CiT. 2003), a patent examiner may nevertheless use a narrower construction than 
later used by a patent owner in litigation. Indeed, different patent examiners are more prone to 
require alterations of claim language, which indicates that different examiners tend to interpret 
claims differently. Lichtman, supra note 13, at 155, 170. 
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limited to a nail. 134 Because patent applicants must always describe at 
least one embodiment of the invention, such as the best mode of 
practicing the invention,135 a patentee who uses broad claim terms can 
supplement the Doctrine of Equivalents by providing additional 
information regarding the invention in the form of a more general 
description. 136 In this way, broad claim terms are a small but 
meaningful enhancement to communication regarding patent scope. 13? 
Perhaps for this reason, patent law encourages the use of broad claim 
terms. For example, if a patentee's specification covers material that 
could have been claimed-but was not-the patentee cannot later claim 
that foregone patent scope. 138 That portion of the invention may pass 
into the public domain. 
Despite its advantages, however, the use of broad claim terms 
also engenders uncertainty regarding claim scope. Although all words 
have uncertain meanings beyond their prototypical cores,139 the 
breadth of this uncertain margin will generally be larger with broader 
terms as opposed to narrower terms. For example, the uncertain 
margin for "connector" may include the uncertain margins for "nail," 
"screw," and "glue." Broad terms therefore are particularly amenable 
to different interpretations. Using broad claim terms can also lead to 
uncertainty regarding patent scope because language often broadens 
in jumps, rather than along a smooth gradient. 14o For example, if the 
initial embodiment of an invention utilizes a nail to connect two 
134. Kieff, supra note 14, at 111-12; see, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 205 
(giving an example of the use of broad claim terms). 
135. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
136. See also Lichtman, supra note 13, at 152 (arguing that the Doctrine of Equivalents 
applies when claim language is imprecise). For a discussion of proposals that seek to reduce 
reliance on the Doctrine of Equivalents in favor of providing greater certainty regarding the 
literal scope of patent claims, see generally Thomas, supra note 58, at 169-75. 
137. The use of broad claim terms may reduce uncertainty more than reliance of the 
Doctrine of Equivalents because the former is more explicit than the latter. It is doubtful, 
however, that the Doctrine of Equivalents could be eliminated through explicit claiming without 
undermining innovation. See Lichtman, supra note 13, at 177 n.59; see also Smith, supra note 
18, at 1182 (noting that "elimination of possibilities of misunderstanding will be subject to 
falling marginal benefits and increasing marginal costs, and the goal is to try to equate them, not 
to eliminate the potential for misunderstanding completely"). 
138. Thomas, supra note 58, at 159-60. 
139. See supra Parts liLA. I and IILA.2. 
140. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 195 (discussing the difficulty in construing 
the scope of abstract patent terms); see also Smith, supra note 94, at 1755 (noting that there is 
"some indeterminacy around the edges" of patents); HOHFELD, supra note 18, at 30 ("Much of 
the difficulty, as regards legal terminology, arises from the fact that many of our words were 
originally applicable only to physical things; so that their use in connection with legal relations 
is, strictly speaking, figurative or fictional." (footnote omitted)). 
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pieces of material, to capture a slightly different embodiment that 
uses screws, staples, or rivets instead of nails, the patentee may use a 
term broader than "nail," such as "connector." This broad term, 
however, may include cases that are not materially the same as the 
motivating embodiment. "Connector" includes many concepts 
different from nails, screws, staples, and rivets, such as glue, Velcro, 
magnetism, and gravity. Some of these means of connecting may go 
beyond the invention. 
Certain rules of interpretation can reduce this uncertainty. For 
example, ambiguous claim terms may be construed narrowly: "Where 
there is an equal choice between a broader and a narrower meaning of 
a claim, and there is an enabling disclosure that indicates that the 
applicant is at least entitled to a claim having the narrower meaning, 
[a court may] consider the notice function of the claim to be best 
served by adopting the narrower meaning.,,141 Moreover, if a claim is 
"insolubly ambiguous, and no narrowing construction can properly be 
adopted, [a court may hold] the claim indefinite" and thus invalid. 142 
Another rule of patent law facilitates the use of broad terminology, 
while simultaneously correlating patent scope with the scope of the 
invention, by allowing patentees to implicitly redefine a word to be 
narrower than the word's ordinary meaning. 143 For example, as noted 
above, a patent applicant may use a nail in the initial embodiment of 
an invention, and then use the broader term "connector" in the patent 
application. If, throughout the patent specification, the applicant 
describes connectors in the invention as puncturing, piercing, and 
making holes, a court might later construe "connector" to exclude 
glue, even though glue is a type of connector. 144 In such a case, the 
court might conclude that the patentee and the examiner understood 
"connector" to be limited to mechanisms that bonded by physical 
rather than chemical means, and that the patentee acted as a 
141. Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996); 
see Hubbard, supra note 7, at 424. 
142. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
Courts rely on indefiniteness in only 5.8% of patent invalidations. John R. Allison & Mark A. 
Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 208 
(1998); see also Pharmastem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1373 (noting 
that a claim is not indefinite if "one skilled in the art would understand the bounds of the claim 
when read in light of the specification." (quoting Miles Labs., Inc. v. Shandon, Inc., 997 F.2d 
870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1993))). 
143. Patent protection cannot be extended beyond the scope of invention. Inpro II 
Licensing, S.A.R.L. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 450 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
144. See Fram et aI., supra note 104 (describing factors a court may consider in 
determining whether to implicitly limit the scope of claim tenus). 
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lexicographer to redefine more narrowly the word "connector" for the 
purposes of the patent. The implicit limitation of claim terms has 
drawbacks similar to the problems of implicit broadening of patent 
scope through the Doctrine of Equivalents. Implicit limitation of 
broad terms involves substantial interpretation of patent claims in 
light of the specification and disagreements regarding interpretations 
may develop that can only be resolved through litigation. 145 
B. Analogies Between Patents and Other Legal 
Communications 
Courts and commentators often contend that a high level of ex 
ante clarity is achieved in legal communications in such diverse areas 
as real property boundaries, contracts rights, and statutes, and that, 
therefore, patents can likewise be made clearer ex ante by changes in 
the law. 146 These comparisons between patents and other legal 
instruments are misguided both because they do not recognize the 
patent-specific obstacles to communication and because they 
overstate the clarity in other legal instruments. 147 As a result, such 
comparisons not only often fail to provide meaningful insight into 
improving communications regarding patent scope but also may result 
in inefficiency and confusion. 148 
145. Miller, supra note 53, at 204; Thomas, supra note 58, at 162-63. The uncertainty 
resulting from implicit limitations on broad claim terms can be-and sometimes is-reduced 
through more explicit claim language. Explicit yet broad claim terms cannot, however, eliminate 
all uncertainty. In addition to the obstacles to drafting explicit claims noted above, see supra 
Parts lILA. I and III.A.2, identifying the need for explicit limitations is difficult to anticipate ex 
ante (that is, before the patent issues) because, unless a patent applicant and examiner disagree 
about the scope of a term, the need for clarification may not be identified until after the patent 
issues. Indeed, patentees and patent examiners are more likely to agree on the contextual, 
limited meaning of a term because their communication is more personal than a formal 
communication mediated only by the words of a patent. See Smith, supra note 18, at 1131. 
146. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 30-33 (critiquing patent law for not providing 
notice of boundaries as clear as real property law); Mullally, supra note 9, at 339 n.33 
(contending that statutes and contracts "are particularly useful analogues to patents"); Osenga, 
supra note 8, at 70 ("Claim construction, in many respects, is not unlike the processes of 
statutory and contract interpretation that are well-worn provinces of the district court judge."); 
Burk & Lemley, supra note 74, at 50-51 (discussing comparisons between claim construction 
and statutory and contractual interpretation); Lichtman, supra note 13, at 152 (noting that patent 
claim interpretation "bears an obvious resemblance to a perhaps more familiar question in 
statutory interpretation"). 
147. But see Lefstin, supra note 8, at 1092 (arguing that claim interpretation is no more 
indeterminate that contract interpretation). For a short critique of Lefstin's study, see supra note 
96. 
148. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD 95 (2001) (arguing that "real harm" may arise from applying to intellectual 
property the "systems of control" used for physical property). 
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1. Patents and Real Property 
Courts frequently compare patent scope to the "metes and 
bounds" of real property, 149 suggesting that the former is or should be 
as clear as the latter. The metes and bounds of real property, however, 
describe boundaries in the current, observable world and therefore do 
not suffer from the indeterminacy of fact involved with patents. 150 
The location of these physical boundaries can usually be known as a 
fact, and thus does not suffer from any need for "broadening.,,151 
When combined with the relatively easily applied ad ceo/urn rule, 
these boundaries can be translated into three dimensions by a "rigid 
algorithm.,,152 Moreover, the extent to which unknown facts can be 
relevant is circumscribed in a fashion entirely dissimilar to patents; 
real property is frequently developed substantially within the 
boundaries, not right along its edges. Indeed, development close to 
the boundaries of real property may be prohibited by law, as with 
149. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 622 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("In drafting an original claim of a 
patent application, the writer sets out the metes and bounds of the invention .... "); Burke, Inc. 
v. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc., 183 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("A claim in a patent 
provides the metes and bounds of the right which the patent confers on the patentee to exclude 
others from making, using or selling the protected invention." (quoting Corning Glass Works v. 
Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989))); Scaltech Inc. v. 
Retec/Tetra, L.L.c., 178 F.3d 1378, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that "a claim in a patent 
provides the metes and bounds of the right which the patent confers on the patentee to exclude 
others from making, using, or selling the protected invention"); Hoechst-Roussel Pharms., Inc. 
v. Lehman, 109 F.3d 756, 758 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 
654, 660 (7th Cir. 1995) ("In the patent 'bargain,' the claims define what the patentee receives, 
the 'metes and bounds' from which he can exclude competitors."); Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) ("The legal effect of the patent 
claim is to establish the metes and bounds of the patent right to exclude; this is a matter of 
law."); In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("It is the claims which define 
the metes and bounds of the invention entitled to the protection of the patent system."); Zenith 
Labs., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("It is the claim 
that sets the metes and bounds of the invention entitled to the protection of the patent system."); 
see a/so Lefstin, supra note 8, at 1025 ("A patent's claims define with words the limits of the 
inventor's exclusive rights, just as physical boundaries may define the limits of real property 
rights."). 
150. See Long, supra note 18, at 482-83 (noting that measuring the boundaries of real 
property is easier than with patents because real property is tangible). 
151. Descriptions of a parcel of land within a deed can be ambiguous, but property law 
relies on clear default rules to resolve such uncertainty, favoring monuments in the descriptions 
of a boundary over descriptions of a course of travel, courses of travel over measurements of 
distances, and distances over quantities like acreage. Hubbard, supra note 7, at 406. When 
ambiguity or vagueness regarding a boundary for real property cannot be resolved, moreover, 
property law does not require that the owner forfeit rights to the entire parcel of land on the 
grounds that it is "invalid." 
152. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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mandatory set-backs. 153 As a result, uncertainty in the location of 
those boundaries is relatively unlikely to be material. I54 Patents, in 
contrast, lack such a bias away from boundaries. Compared to real 
property, patent infringement is more likely to occur in the uncertain 
margin beyond prototypical examples. 155 
The metes and bounds of real property also do not suffer from 
any meaningful indeterminacy of aim because the aim in the portion 
of the deed describing the boundaries is to describe the current 
physical scope of the parcel in terms of easily identified, unchanging 
measurements. 156 The boundary description in a deed does not 
describe the full contours of the owner's rights, such as the activities 
within the boundaries that the owner can engage in or prohibit. 157 
Patents, on the other hand, aim to describe exactly that: activities by 
third parties that infringe the patent. 158 Aiming at those activities 
while ignorant of the facts of some of those activities is far more 
difficult than simply describing particular physical boundaries. 159 
Thus, comparing patents to parcels of land misrepresents the potential 
for clear and certain patent claims. 160 It is more apt to compare patents 
153. DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENS MEYER, URBAN PLANNING & 
LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 4.8 (2d ed. 1986). 
154. Furthermore, when real property will be developed near its boundaries, greater 
resources can be spent to improve certainty regarding boundary location before such 
development. Such ex ante determinations are not possible with patents. See supra notes 85-94 
and accompanying text. 
155. See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text. 
156. See generally ANDRO LINKLATER, MEASURING AMERICA: How AN UNTAMED 
WILDERNESS SHAPED THE UNITED STATES AND FULFILLED THE PROMISE OF DEMOCRACY 
(2002) (describing the importance of measuring techniques to systems of real property). Where 
boundaries change, for example by accretion or erosion in coastal lands, there are clear default 
rules. JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 44-52 (2d 
ed.2002). 
157. Moreover, boundaries describe only the "outline" of the property, not the full 
contours of its interior. See Long, supra note 18, at 484. Land is also "well ordered" in that a 
trespasser cannot somehow occupy a space interior to a boundary without crossing a property 
boundary. With patents, such notions of boundaries are inapplicable. 
158. See Long, supra note 18, at 499 (noting that patents "provide a thick description of 
qualitative aspects of the invention"). 
159. See Ellickson, supra note 7, at 1327-28 (describing the reduction in monitoring costs 
produced by clear boundaries). Henry Smith has argued that the regulation of the uses of 
property can be placed on a spectrum from exclusion, which involves the use of boundaries as 
rough proxies for activities, to governance, which addresses particular activities and particular 
actors. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property 
Rights, 31 1. Legal Stud. 453, 455 (2002). Governance of activities is more fine-grained but can 
be more expensive than exclusion based on physical boundaries. Id. (noting that governance 
strategies place a higher informational burden on duty holders). 
160. Moreover, the Patent Act makes it clear that, absent contrary statutory provisions, 
patents are to be treated as personal property. 35 U.S.c. § 261 (2000). 
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with the activity limitations involved in real property, such as zoning, 
which requires boards and commissions to address, in an ex post 
context, specific issues raised by broad categorical rules. 
Furthermore, because the average audience size for communicating 
the boundaries of real property is likely much larger than for patents, 
many communication costs can be amortized over this large group. 
Even though the audience for real property may be geographically 
limited, many different types of persons in that location may be 
involved in communications, particularly since real property has no 
temporal term, unlike patents. 161 Finally, communications regarding 
real property justify greater investment in clear messages ex ante. 
Most real property is valuable, and that value can justify investment, 
like signs and fences, to provide a clear boundary definition. In 
contrast, the vast majority of patents do not produce any revenue, and, 
thus, additional investment in boundary definition regarding many 
patents cannot be justified. 162 
2. Patents and Contracts 
Contracts enjoy substantial communication advantages over 
patents. One advantage with contracts is that the parties to a contract 
dispute are typically the same parties involved in the contract's 
formation. For example, the core of a contract is the parties' "meeting 
of the minds," which both parties will want to memorialize clearly. 163 
If a dispute arises regarding the meaning of a contract term, both 
parties can provide evidence regarding the "meeting of the minds." 
With a patent, however, a patent examiner is involved in the creation 
of the patent and an alleged infringer is involved in a later dispute 
regarding patent scope. Federal regulations prevent the patent 
examiner from being involved in later patent infringement 
proceedings,164 and a potential future infringer has no right to 
161. Smith, supra note 18, at 1184. In one sense, the life of a patent is not limited in that, 
once a patent owner's rights expire, the patent passes to the public at large. The patentee, 
however, does not internalize a meaningful portion of those benefits, and therefore likely does 
not consider those benefits when incurring costs communicating the scope ofthe patent. 
162. Mark A. Lemley has estimated that only 5% of patents produce revenue. Mark A. 
Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1507 (2001). Other 
scholars have also argued that most patents do not have value. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, 
supra note 8, at 100 ("This suggests that the majority of patents are not worth more than a few 
thousand dollars."). 
163. Smith, supra note 18, at 1136. But see id. (noting that some scholars interpret contract 
negotiation as "rife with conflict"). 
164. 37 C.F.R. § 104.23 (2007) (prohibiting employees of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office from providing "expert testimony in any legal proceedings regarding Office 
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partIcIpate in the prosecution of the patents, particularly since the 
patent applications are initially confidential. 165 Even if there were 
such a right, the identity of an alleged infringer may not be known 
until the time of infringement, which could be years after the patent 
has issued. 
In addition, parties to a contract can afford to expend greater 
resources drafting detailed and clear messages that promote certainty. 
A rational person will work to enhance the certainty of the terms of a 
contract until the marginal costs of such efforts exceed their marginal 
benefits. Because the vast majority of contracts provide some benefit 
to the parties, the marginal benefit of increased certainty is non-
trivial, and some meaningful effort may be spent on improving the 
certainty of the contract. Contracts can take months and many 
thousands of dollars to negotiate, and this investment is justified by 
the expected benefits from the contract. In contrast, because most 
patents do not yield any revenue, patentees cannot afford to invest as 
much money in drafting and prosecuting patents. 166 
Finally, the certainty regarding contracts should not be 
overstated. Contracts undoubtedly include unclear language at times, 
and many contract disputes often center on disagreements regarding 
the meaning of contract terms. 167 Moreover, contract law provides for 
some adjustment of contractual terms after the contract has been 
entered based on unforeseen future events. For example, when 
unforeseen circumstances arise, a court may construe a contract to 
include terms that the parties would have negotiated had the 
circumstances been known at the time the contract was signed. 168 
information, subjects or activities"). In certain limited contexts, the examiner's interpretation 
may be inferred. For example, if there is a strong inference that "the PTO would have 
recognized that one claim interpretation would render the claim invalid, and that the PTO would 
not have issued the patent assuming that to be the proper construction of the term," a court may 
decide that the claim should not receive that construction. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 
1303, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane); see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 226 
(recommending that patent examiners start recording the interpretation of claims that they use to 
decide patent validity). 
165. 35 U.S.c. § 122 (2000). 
166. Contracts may also rely on "standardized" terminology. Smith, supra note 18, at 
1149. The meaning of such terms are largely established before the contract is signed, and, to 
the extent that further clarification of that terminology is required, those costs can be amortized 
over all contracts using those standardized terms. 
167. See, e.g., InterDigital Commc'ns Corp. v. Nokia Corp., 407 F. Supp. 2d 522, 529-30 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (involving a contract dispute regarding, inter alia, the meaning ofthe term "the 
assets"). 
168. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. SI. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 249 N.Y.S.2d 
208, 214 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1981) 
("When the parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect 
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Similarly, under the doctrine of Frustration of Purpose, courts may 
sometimes excuse a party from performing contractual obligations 
that have been affected by unforeseen events. 169 
3. Patents and Statutes 
It is tempting to analogize patents to statutes because statutes 
suffer from some of the same communication weaknesses as patents. 
Statutes are often designed to apply in varied factual circumstances. 
Consequently, like patents, statutes frequently utilize broad, open-
textured terms. Moreover, legislators may agree only regarding broad 
concepts and disagree regarding specific details, so that less detailed 
language may therefore be more likely to gain majority support. 170 
For these (and perhaps other) reasons,171 the language in statutes is 
often extremely open-textured. l72 In this respect, comparisons 
between patents and statutes do not suggest that the scope of patents 
should be made clearer. 
Despite these similarities, statutes enJoy important 
communication advantages that patents lack. First, Congress can 
afford to expend more resources drafting and critiquing statutes than 
patentees can spend drafting patents. In 2006, the USPTO received 
more than 417,000 new patent applications l73 and issued more than 
180,000 patents. 174 In contrast, in 2006 the 109th Congress-which had 
Republican majorities in both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate during a Republican presidency-managed to pass only 249 
to a term which is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is 
reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court."). 
169. In re Schenck Tours, Inc., 69 B.R. 906, 911 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987); In re M & M 
Transp. Co. v. Schuster Express, Inc., 13 B.R. 861, 869 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); Farlou Realty 
Corp. v. Woodsam Assocs., 49 N.Y.S.2d 367, 371 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944). 
170. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 
(1984) (stating that one reason that Congress might have used uncertain language might have 
been that "Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question"); cf Long, 
supra note 18, at 506 (discussing the same phenomena with patents). 
171. A full discussion of the reasons for uncertainty in the drafting oflegislation is beyond 
the scope of this article. 
172. Statutes often require substantial interpretation to determine their precise meaning. 
HART, supra note 12, at 131-32; Mullally, supra note 9, at 363. 
173. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, Peiformance and Accountability Report Fiscal 
Year 2006, USPTO ANNUAL REpORTS (2006), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/corn!annuaI/2006/3020100yatentperfrm.html; see also 
Miller, supra note 53, at 197 (reporting that the USPTO receives more than 300,000 patent 
applications every year). 
174. This figure was obtained by running a search on the USPTO's official website for 
patents issuing in the year 2006. See http://patft.uspto.gov (click the "Advanced Search" link in 
"Issued Patents" section; query using the text "isdl20060 I 0 1->20061231 "). 
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bills and 1,345 measures. 175 With far fewer laws being passed 
compared to patents, the legislators can divert substantially more 
resources to ensuring statutory clarity, provided they have the 
political will to do SO.176 In addition, interested parties can lobby the 
legislature to address their concerns, including concerns about clarity 
of meaning. 
Second, though the scope of a term in a statute is often clarified 
long after the statute is passed, there is a more robust, institutionalized 
scheme for this process than in the case of patents. Words and phrases 
in statutes are frequently interpreted by courts, and these 
interpretations carry the force of precedent. For example, 42 V.S.C. 
§ 1988 provides that a court may award "reasonable" attorney's fees 
to a "prevailing party" (except a government party) in an action 
brought under 42 V.S.c. § 1983 regarding the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. In 
complex litigation involving multiple claims, however, it may be 
unclear whether a party has "prevailed." Courts have accordingly 
elaborated on the meaning of this term. 177 These cases do not merely 
decide the meaning of this term in individual instances. Through stare 
decisis, these decisions have created a robust rule for interpreting 
"prevailing" in future cases as well. Furthermore, courts attempt to 
provide further clarity by similarly construing the same terms in 
different statutes. 178 For example, courts typically treat "prevailing 
party" and "reasonable" fee provisions the same in § 1988 and other 
statutes, including § 285 of the Patent ACt. 179 This effort to promote 
175. The Senate publishes reports of Congressional efforts at 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayoutireference/two_column_tablelResumes.htm. The 
Congressional resume for the 2006 session of the 109th Congress is available at 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/I 09_2. pdf. 
176. At the end of 2006, the USPTO employed 4,883 patent examiners, see U.S. PATENT 
& TRADEMARK OFFICE, Performance and Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2006. Table 28: 
End of Year Personnel, USPTO ANNUAL REpORTS (2006), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2006/50328_table28.html. whereas Congress is 
composed of 100 Senators and 435 members of the House of Representatives. Although the 
number of patent examiners is nearly 10 times the number of legislators, the number of patent 
applications filed in 2006 is more than 250 times the number of bills and measures passed in 
2006. Moreover, legislators often employ substantial networks of support staff. 
177. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't. of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 603 (2001); Highway Equip. Co. v. FECO, Ltd., 469 F.3d 1027, 1035 (Fed. Cir. 
2006); Inland Steel Co. v. LTV Steel Co., 364 F.3d 1318, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
178. See Kaplow, supra note 36, at 577-79. 
179. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000); Highway Equip. Co., 469 F.3d at 1035 (noting that 
"prevailing party" has a similar meaning for the purposes of § 285 of the Patent Act, 28 U.S.C. § 
1988, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 54). Copyright law also provides for the award of "reasonable" fees to 
the "prevailing party" in some cases. 17 U.S.c. § 505 (2000). 
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consistency provides greater certainty regarding the meanings of 
statutes and clarification costs can be amortized over many cases. 180 
Administrative agencies address indeterminate portions of 
statutes through administrative adjudication. 181 Agencies also create 
new messages regarding the scope of legislation through 
administrative rulemaking. 182 In fact, agencies are considered 
particUlarly adept when interpreting and elaborating on Congress's 
statutory messages. Under the Chevron l83 Doctrine, administrative 
agencies are given substantial deference when construing a statute 
that the agency administers. 184 When the meaning of a statute is 
unclear, the agency's interpretation prevails if it is "a permissible 
construction of the statute," that is, unless the construction is 
"arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.,,185 
In contrast, patent law provides only two types of post-issuance 
administrative review of patents-reissuance and reexamination-and 
neither of these administrative procedures provides meaningful 
opportunities to clarify patent scope. Reissue procedures only allow a 
patent owner to correct inadvertent "mistakes" that render the patent 
"wholly or partly inoperative or invalid.,,186 Though such corrections 
may occasionally clarify the scope of a patent, uncertainty in patent 
claims is often inherent and not a mistake. Moreover, reissuance 
proceedings can only be brought by the patent owner,187 and thus 
cannot help potential infringers resolve uncertainty about the scope of 
a patent. In reexamination proceedings, the patentee or a third party 
requests that the USPTO review an issued patent regarding a 
"substantial new question of patentability.,,188 In responding to the 
reexamination, the patentee can amend the patent. Though the 
180. H.L.A. Hart has cautioned that identically applying the same terms in different 
statutes-creating a "heaven of concepts"-may prevent a statute from meeting its legislative 
aims, in some cases. HART, supra note 12, at 130. 
181. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 418, 424 (1999) (discussing the 
Board of Immigration Appeals's interpretation ofa federal statute). 
182. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 
(1984). 
183. Id. 
184. Id.; see also Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424 (granting Chevron "deference" to an 
interpretation of a statute in administrative adjudication). This authority does not apply when 
Congress has addressed the precise question at issue. Only when there is some uncertainty-as in 
cases that are not plain or prototypical-will agencies enjoy deference. 
185. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. 
186. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000); see also 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000). 
187. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.176 (2000) (noting that reissue proceedings will proceed "in the 
same manner as a non-reissue, non-provisional application"). 
188. 35 U.S.c. § 303 (2000). 
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amendment might be clearer than the original patent, particularly 
because it can be contrasted with the unamended patent, such 
"clarifying" amendments are merely coincident to the patentability 
challenge and may not occur. More importantly, an amendment 
changes the patent scope instead of clarifying the scope of the 
original patent. 
The vast majority of clarification of patent scope occurs ex post 
through judicial interpretation of patents. 189 Such adjudication is, 
however, different from the judicial interpretation of statutes in at 
least two respects. First, interpretation of claim terms is expensive 
compared to statutory interpretation. Many statutes are central to 
multiple lawsuits, and the cost to the courts (and other repeat players) 
of interpreting statutory language can be amortized over multiple 
applications of that statute. In contrast, relatively few patents are 
addressed in multiple lawsuits. 190 Consequently, there is less 
opportunity to amortize the cost of judicial interpretation. Second, 
judicial interpretation of statutes is viewed as part of the system, not 
as a reason, sufficient by itself, to impose radical changes on the 
process of creating statutes. In contrast, critics of patent law argue 
that patent claims need to be clearer in order to avoid the need for 
post-issuance interpretation through litigation. 191 
C. Inefficiency of Relying Solely on Ex Ante Clarification 
For any given set of interpretive rules, the creation of clearer, 
more detailed messages requires additional investment by the party 
creating and sending those messages. As a result, drafting more 
explicit patents and patent claims requires additional investment by 
patentees and may require additional work on the part of patent 
examiners as well. These additional costs will not be efficient unless 
they are outweighed by the benefits they produce. However, it 
189. In 2007, approximately 770 reexamination proceedings and 994 reissue proceedings 
were initiated. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REpORT: FISCAL YEAR 2007 110, 121 (2008), available at 
http://www. uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2007 /2007annualreport.pdf. In contrast, more 
than 2,500 patent suits are initiated each year. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 122. More 
importantly, reexamination and reissue proceedings focus on validity and therefore provide little 
opportunity for clarification of patent scope. See supra notes 186-188 and accompanying text. 
190. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Mayer, 1., 
dissenting). 
191. See, e.g., Mullally, supra note 9, at 380 (arguing that the cost of increased disclosure 
in patents may be "offset in the avoidance of greater costs to the public and the avoidance of 
litigation" (footnote omitted)); Kieff, supra note 14, at 110 (arguing that the cost to patentees of 
improved drafting "are substantially less than those associated with litigating"). 
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appears that there will be no benefit in most instances because so few 
patents ever yield any value to the patentees. Mark Lemley estimates 
that only 5% of patents ultimately provide any revenue to owners.192 
Given this percentage, ex ante efforts would be inefficient unless the 
average benefit added to patents through these efforts was, by one 
estimation, at least twenty times their average COSt. 193 Though other 
estimates are more conservative, they are consistent with the lack of 
substantial economic value of most patents. James Bessen and 
Michael J. Meurer report that more than half of all patents expire 
prematurely because their owners are unwilling to pay renewal fees. 
"This suggests that the majority of patents are not worth more than a 
few thousand dollars.,,194 Because ex ante measures for improved 
communication of patent scope must produce a high return on 
investment, such proposals should not be implemented absent 
compelling support demonstrating a high ratio of average benefits to 
average costs. 195 
Another reason it is often inefficient to invest additional 
resources improving the quality of the messages sent regarding patent 
scope is that patent communications provide relatively little 
opportunity for the amortization of such costs. Patents communicate 
to a relatively small audience because they are intended to be read and 
interpreted only by practitioners in a certain technical field. 196 
192. Lemley, supra note 162, at 1507; see also Thomas, supra note 58, at 166 (discussing 
Lemley's conclusions); Miller, supra note 53, (discussing Lemley's conclusions). Lemley 
acknowledges that the figure he reports of 5% does not include patents that are cross-licensed. 
These patents, however, are largely irrelevant to a discussion of improving communications 
regarding patent scope. "Large companies tend to come to the table with hundreds of patents on 
each side, relying on volume rather than quality in some sort of 'patent arms race.'" Lemley, 
supra note 162, at 1504. Similarly, some patents may be valuable, but never the subject of 
licensing discussions or disputes. Such patents, however, likely do not exhibit problems with 
communicating patent scope because those patents are not the subject of a disagreement 
regarding scope. 
193. In theory, improved communication could render valuable some 95% of the patents 
that previously did not yield any revenue. Even if the improved communication doubled the 
number of patents producing any value (a very unlikely result), however, the benefits of the 
proposal still must be ten times greater than its per-patent cost to justify the proposal. Moreover, 
raising the cost of obtaining a patent might encourage some inventors not to seek patent 
protection at all, thereby potentially reducing the number of patents with some value. 
194. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 100; see also id. at 104 ("Each patent is like a 
lottery ticket."). 
195. Miller, supra note 53, at 196 (noting that "it would of course be foolish to mandate 
new disclosure rules so exacting that the increased cost of patent preparation swamps any 
predictability benefit that the changes would produce."). 
196. Long, supra note 18, at 487-88, 523. This specialized audience may provide for some 
communication advantages compared to other forms of property because specialized audiences 
may be able to interpret messages more easily. Henry Smith has argued that efficiency generally 
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Moreover, amortization effects are also reduced by the fact that 
patents are limited by both de jure and de facto time restrictions. 
Patents last less than twenty years,197 but a patent related to rapidly 
changing technology may become obsolete in less time. 
Despite these reasons to doubt the efficiency of improving the 
quality of the messages sent regarding patent scope, commentators 
have focused on changes to patent law that are designed to encourage 
all patentees to provide more information ex ante regarding patent 
scope. 198 For example, some have suggested requiring a glossary 
regarding terms in the patent. 199 Others have suggested new rules of 
interpretation, such as construing all uncertainties in a patent against 
the patentee as the drafter. 200 Such an "information-forcing penalty 
default" would, it is hoped, encourage the patentee to disclose 
information resolving those ambiguities. Such proposals to improve 
ex ante communication are unlikely to improve patent certainty 
efficiently. As an initial matter, these proposals mistakenly assume 
that the patentee possesses the information needed to prevent 
uncertainty?OI As noted above, some of the sources of patent-scope 
requires that the size of an audience for a given message is inversely proportional to the amount 
of information contained in the message. "For the same cost, one can communicate a lot to a 
small, close-knit audience or a little to a large, anonymous audience." Smith, supra note 18, at 
1125. Smith's thesis indicates that, with a small specialized audience, the marginal benefits from 
a modest investment in increased certainty may be large. Given the relatively small audience 
size for patents, a substantial amount of detailed information is, in fact, communicated, 
particularly in the "plain cases" noted above. See id. at 1173-76 (discussing the audiences for 
patents); supra note 162 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, because many patents do not 
generate any revenue, the expected benefit from increased ex ante investment in communication 
must be substantially discounted so that, even if a modest investment can substantially increase 
certainty, that expenditure may not exceed the expected benefit. 
197. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000). 
198. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 239; Mullally, supra note 9, at 380; Thomas, 
supra note 58, at 164 (noting that "many commentators believe it is only fair that inventors 
should claim their inventions precisely."). 
199. Miller, supra note 53, at 203-05; see also Mullally, supra note 9, at 377-78 
(discussing the voluntary use ofa glossary). 
200. Burk & Lemley, supra note 74, at 54; Miller, supra note 53, at 186. 
20 I. Mullally, supra note 9, at 379; Bender, supra note 13, at 220; Thomas, supra note 58, 
at 167; see, e.g., Miller, supra note 53, at 206 (proposing that patentees "provide an exclusive, 
exhaustive list of express definitions for any claim term to which the applicant gives a meaning 
other than it [sic] ordinary meaning"); Kieff, supra note 14, at 110-\2 (advocating that patentees 
"simply draft[] a better patent disclosure at the outset"); Bender, supra note 13, at 220 
(proposing that patentees identify when they act as their own lexicographers); see also Long, 
supra note 18, at 538 ("When the information costs of comprehending intangible goods are 
high, legal rules can compensate in other ways, such as by shifting information costs from 
observers onto owners, by forcing owners to disgorge information about the goods, or by 
lowering the sanction against observers for violating their legal duties."). 
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uncertainty are inherent.202 Moreover, these proposals fail to establish 
that the cost of reducing any uncertainties is less than the benefits of 
the proposals, given the need to incur costs for the majority of patents 
where claim scope certainty will never matter. 203 
IV. IMPROVING COMMUNICATION AND DEFINITION OF PATENT 
SCOPE 
A. The Efficient Definition and Communication of Patent Scope 
Increasing the clarity of patent scope ex ante may prevent the 
sometimes substantial costs caused by uncertainty,204 but additional 
resources should not be devoted to increased ex ante clarification 
unless the marginal costs exceed the resulting marginal gains. As 
indicated above, communication difficulties regarding patent scope 
limit the marginal benefits of enhanced ex ante delineation. For 
example, some sources of uncertainty regarding patent scope are 
difficult, if not impossible, to address ex ante. Words in patent claims, 
particularly broad terms, are inherently imprecise. Likewise, 
infringement scenarios that cannot be reasonably foreseen cannot be 
considered and addressed ex ante. Furthermore, even when enhanced 
ex ante delineation is possible, it may not be cost-effective because so 
few patents yield meaningful revenue.20S Requiring patent applicants 
to include additional information might produce benefits for a small 
group of patents, but would raise costs for every application. 
Efficiency is more likely to be achieved by deferring some 
efforts to determine more precisely the scope of a patent until after a 
patent is asserted-that is, ex post. Clarification at that time does not 
suffer from the efficiency-limiting constraints noted above. Although 
the words in a patent may still be inherently imprecise, the scope of 
the patent need only be partially clarified-enough to address the 
alleged infringement. Similarly, ex post clarification need not address 
all potential infringement scenarios. Instead, it is only necessary to 
202. See supra Parts III.A.I to IlI.A.3. 
203. But see Miller, supra note 53, at 196-99 (arguing that certain enhancements to patent 
disclosure are cost effective). Reforms premised on using the preexisting patent disclosure 
requirements more effectively to promote clarity-particularly in the "plain cases" for which 
terms are clear-<lo not suffer from this deficiency. But cf Lemley, supra note 162, at 1523 
(noting that an argument against expanding the procedures for reviewing patent applications is 
consistent with proposals to improve the quality of the review without such expansions). 
204. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text. 
205. See supra notes 192-195 and accompanying text. 
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address the alleged infringement at issue?06 Moreover, ex post 
clarification is likely to be required in the case of patents with 
sufficient potential value to justify a dispute. Though this ex post 
approach involves costs caused by ex ante errors in market behavior 
resulting from mistakes about the scope of patents and by the need to 
interpret the words in patent claims and to clarify the indeterminate 
aspects, it is likely to be more efficient than requiring all patentees to 
provide enhanced ex ante messages regarding the scope of all 
patents.207 
Though some critics have argued that patents should have clear 
ex ante boundaries like real property,208 an important body of 
scholarship concerning traditional property supports the advantage of 
ex post clarification of patent rights. For example, Terry Anderson 
and P.J. Hill argue in their well-known study of real property in the 
American West that, when the scope of an asset is uncertain and the 
resolution of that uncertainty through boundary definition activity 
could increase its value, efficiency may favor improving boundary 
definition for the asset.209 The increase in value (marginal gain) 
efficiently justifies an increase in boundary definition (marginal cost). 
For example, Anderson and Hill contend that rising land values and 
the reduced cost of boundary communication made possible by the 
introduction of barbed wire led to the fencing of the American range. 
These changes led to an "increase of the productivity [in property] 
definition and enforcement activity" in the form of fences? 10 
Though Anderson and Hill focus on the marginal costs and 
benefits of establishing and enforcing boundaries in order to create 
new private property rights, such as the privatization of public 
property like land in the Great Plains, the same efficiency concerns 
206. In fact, in typical patent litigation, the meaning of some claim terms is not contested. 
Disputes focus on less than all of the claim terms. 
207. James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer argue that patent reform is necessary because 
the costs of patent litigation-the mainstay of ex post clarification of patent scope--<:urrently 
exceed the benefits of patents. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 218,222-23. In short, they 
argue that the entire patent system is inefficient. Even if these commentators are correct, for the 
reasons noted herein, some ex post clarification of patent scope is important in a patent system 
that is operating efficiently. 
208. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 46-72. 
209. Terry L. Anderson & P.l. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the 
American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 167 (1975); see Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of 
Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347, 349 (1967); see also Smith, supra note 18, at 1149-50 
(discussing Demsetz). 
210. Anderson & Hill, supra note 209, at 167. 
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apply to private property rights that already exist.2l1 For example, if 
valuable mineral deposits are discovered on a parcel of land, the 
owner, or her neighbors, may rationally pay for a careful survey of the 
boundaries to determine exactly how much of the mineral deposit she 
can extract without trespassing on neighboring land. In determining 
whether to invest in enhanced boundary definition, it is crucial to 
identify circumstances where such investment will efficiently increase 
the value of the property right. That one parcel of land is more 
valuable if carefully surveyed does not justify an expensive survey for 
all parcels of land. 
When a patent becomes the subject of an infringement dispute, 
increased investment in scope clarification is more likely to produce 
substantial benefits because the patent is likely one of the few patents 
that is valuable and because that value likely depends, at least in part, 
upon the resolution of uncertainties regarding the patent's scope.212 
For that group of patents, the litigation exposes "[a]n increase in the 
probability of loss" of value claimed by the patent owner,213 which 
"will usually result in an increase in the productivity of property 
rights [ definition] activities.,,214 Thus, it is more efficient to focus 
resources on resolving uncertainty at this ex post time than to do so ex 
ante. 
Louis Kaplow's well-known analysis of rules and standards 
further indicates that patent clarification ex post sometimes is more 
efficient than enhanced communication ex ante. Kaplow contrasts 
"rules," which provide details ex ante regarding legally proscribed 
conduct, with "standards," which provide general guidelines that are 
clarified ex post, such as through litigation.215 Kaplow argues that, 
when there is little chance that a law will apply to a particular factual 
scenario, efficiency is promoted by utilizing a standards-based wait-
and-see approach rather than investing resources ex ante to craft a 
detailed rule governing that scenario?16 "For example, the law of 
negligence applies to a wide array of complex accident scenarios, 
211. Jd. 
212. Lichtman, supra note 13, at 179 ("Patents that are drawn into litigation, however, are 
a special subset. They have economic consequence-why else would the parties find it 
worthwhile to invest in litigation?"). But cf Anderson & Hill, supra note 209, at 178 (,The 
higher the value of an asset and the higher the probability of losing the right to use that asset, the 
greater the degree of definition and enforcement activity."). 
213. Anderson & Hill, supra note 209, at 167. 
214. Jd. 
215. Kaplow, supra note 36, at 560. 
216. Jd. at 577; see also id. at 579 ('The value of effort in designing a rule depends upon 
the frequency of behavior subject to the rule .... "). 
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many of which are materially different from each other and, when 
considered in isolation, are unlikely to OCCUr.,,217 Patents impose a 
legal duty not to engage in infringing activities. However, because 
most patents do not generate revenue, they are never applied to 
infringement scenarios. As a result, treating the uncertain margins of 
patent claims as standards to be clarified ex post is likely to be more 
efficient than requiring that patent claims be drafted as fully-specified 
rules?18 
Increased reliance on ex post clarification of patent scope, as 
opposed to increasing ex ante clarification, will cause patent scope to 
be more uncertain for some period of time, and this additional 
uncertainty will entail costs. For example, the uncertainty may chill 
socially beneficial activity that falls within the uncertain portions of 
the patent's scope, even if it is later determined that the activity did 
not, in fact, infringe the patent.219 In addition, there may be litigation 
costs incurred under an ex post system that would not occur as a 
result of the increased certainty available under a more robust ex ante 
scheme. Nevertheless, because of the inherent limits of specifying 
patent scope ex ante and the inefficiency of investing in the majority 
of patents having little or no value, ex post clarification provides 
substantial benefits. To promote "the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts" efficiently, the relative costs and benefits of both ex ante 
specification of patent scope and ex post clarification must be 
balanced.220 
B. Mechanisms for Ex Post Clarification of Patent Scope 
The remainder of this section discusses the current approach to 
ex post clarification of patent scope and some proposals for 
improving it.221 Two fora are generally available for ex post 
217. ld. at 564. 
218. See id. at 573 ("Even if they are extremely costly to apply, the significant likelihood 
that the particular application will never arise may make standards much cheaper."). 
219. For a more lengthy discussion of the costs of uncertain patents, see supra notes 63-66 
and accompanying text. 
220. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Cotropia, supra note 9, at 95. 
221. The proposal to rely on ex post clarification of patent scope has some similarities with 
the "soft look" registration approach described and analyzed by F. Scott Kieff. Under such an 
approach, patent applications are registered, not examined, so that all validity determinations 
occur ex post. Kieff, supra note 14, at 72. Kieffargues that such a registration system would be 
efficient in part because "the costs of providing the information needed to decide validity and 
the costs of 'correct' adjudication with the information are likely to be lower if these 
determinations are made in litigation than if they are made in patent examination." ld. at 73. 
Only patents that ultimately become the subject of a dispute would be tested for validity. ld. at 
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clarification: judicial litigation and administrative proceedings before 
the USPTO.222 
1. Revisions to patent law applied in courts 
Today, uncertainty regarding patent scope is clarified almost 
entirely through ex post judicial review in the form of claim 
construction. Although courts should more explicitly acknowledge 
that the scope of patent claims are largely indeterminate ex ante, 
many patent law doctrines already tacitly recognize that patent scope 
cannot be known ex ante. For example, patent infringement is a strict 
liability offense in that an infringer's ignorance of the scope of a 
patent is not a defense to infringement.223 Similarly, courts have held 
that patent examiners must determine whether to grant a patent 
application based on the broadest reasonable construction of the 
claims, not on the examiner's own understanding.224 This requirement 
recognizes that, if a patent application is granted, the examiner's own 
interpretation of the claims may differ from a later judicial 
construction. In particular, a patent examiner's own understanding of 
the scope of the claims might be narrower than a later judicial claim 
construction. In that case, the patent examiner might never have 
granted the patent application had the examiner considered the 
application using the broader interpretation.225 Courts avoid that 
72. Contrary to the thesis of this article, however, Kieff states that the patent applicant must "put 
the public on clear notice of what will infringe and what will not" and that "the patentee, as 
drafter, is the least cost avoider of such ambiguities." Id. at 99. 
222. Other fora might be available, such as arbitration. 
223. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007); 35 U.S.C. § 284 
(2000). Uncertainty regarding the scope of patent protection suggests that patent infringement 
should perhaps not be a strict liability offense, If an infringer could not have obtained the 
information necessary to avoid infringement, should the infringer nevertheless be liable? This 
issue requires further research and is beyond the scope of this article, in part because an 
infringer may be unable to know about a patent ex ante for reasons unrelated to the clarity of its 
scope, such as when infringement begins when a patent is still in the application stage, BESSEN 
& MEURER, supra note 8, at 10, 
224, Springs Window Fashions LP v. Novo Indus., LP" 323 F.3d 989, 995 (Fed, Cir. 
2003), 
225, That the patent examiner would have granted the patent using the court's construction 
is important because issued patents are by statute presumed to be valid, 35 U.S.c. § 282 (2000), 
Courts have further strengthened this presumption by requiring that invalidity be proven by clear 
and convincing evidence, Zenith Elec. Corp, v, POI Commc'n Sys" Inc" 522 F.3d 1348, 1363 
(Fed, Cir. 2008). This presumption is based at least in part on: 
the deference that is due to a qualified government agency presumed to have 
properly done its job, which includes one or more examiners who are assumed to 
have some expertise in interpreting the references and to be familiar from their 
work with the level of skill in the art and whose duty it is to issue only valid 
patents. 
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problem by reqUITIng examiners to assess patentability using the 
broadest reasonable construction, so that a later judicial claim 
construction is likely to be no broader than the construction used to 
issue the patent. Because narrower claims are more likely to satisfy 
patentability requirements, the patent examiner likely would have 
granted the patent application even if it used the court's later 
construction.226 
Certain patent law doctrines, however, improperly assume that 
patents provide ex ante notice of the scope of patent rights. For 
instance, a court may increase damages for "willful" infringement,227 
and courts sometimes hold that mere knowledge of a patent renders 
infringement willful.228 Merely reading a patent may be held to 
provide sufficient notice of the scope of a patent to render 
infringement willful, thereby entitling the patentee to enhanced 
damages.229 Courts should recognize, however, that the patent, by 
itself, provides notice of scope only with familiar prototypes and 
should limit findings of willful infringement accordingly.23o 
McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262, F.3d 1339, \353 (Fed. Cir. 200 I); accord Lemley, supra 
note 162, at 1527-28. The competence of patent examiners only justifies the presumption of 
validity; however, if a patent examiner would not have granted the patent application had the 
examiner used the claim construction later found by a court. 
226. In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting that this approach 
"serves the public interest by reducing the possibility that claims, finally allowed, will be given 
broader scope than is justified."). 
227. Thomas, supra note 58, at 164-65; see also Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311, 
1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that a finding of willful infringement may support an award of 
enhanced damages). 
228. Thomas, supra note 58, at 164-65. 
229. Id On the other hand, courts reviewing a claim of willful infringement sometimes 
recognize that patents may not ex ante fully delineate the scope of provided rights. A good-faith 
defense to infringement based on a reasonable claim construction-even if that claim 
construction is ultimately rejected by the court-may prevent a patent owner from obtaining 
enhanced damages. Similarly, courts may not award enhanced damages for infringement under 
the Doctrine of Equivalents. "[I]t is not a rule of law that infringement that is not literal can 
never be sufficiently culpable to warrant enhanced damages ... [but] avoidance of literal 
infringement is a fact to be considered and weighed, along with other relevant facts .... " 
Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. 8P Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1583-84 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Difficulties 
in determining patent scope ex ante may also justifY limiting the remedy for patent infringement 
to a reasonable royalty instead of awarding injunctive relief. e8ay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.c., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (requiring courts to consider equitable considerations before 
awarding injunctive relief for patent infringement); see also Smith, supra note 18, at 1166 
(noting the importance oflimiting the liability of audience members in some communications). 
230. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text; see also 8urk & Lemley, supra note 
74, at 55 (arguing that certain patent law doctrines should be adjusted in light of inherent 
indeterminacy in the meanings of patent claims). 
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Courts should also acknowledge that, in light of indetenninacies 
of fact and aim, a patent might not communicate the full extent of 
patent scope to the patentee. For example, patent law requires that a 
patentee include sufficient infonnation in the patent specification "to 
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which 
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same .... ,,231 This 
enablement requirement applies to every patent claim individually, 
mandating that the specification enable each claim so that a skilled 
artisan could practice the invention without the need for "undue 
experimentation.,,232 Significantly, if a claim is not enabled to its full 
scope, it is invalid.233 A patentee, however, may enable a claim to the 
full extent of one possible interpretation of a patent claim, but not a 
broader interpretation that is later adopted by a court. 234 If the 
patentee reasonably and in good faith considered the patent narrower 
than ultimately construed by the court, the court should invalidate the 
patent claim only to the extent that it is broader than the patentee's 
construction. 
2. A New Administrative Proceeding before the USPTO 
to Clarify Patent Scope 
Much of the uncertainty regarding patent scope cannot be 
efficiently addressed ex ante, and ex post clarification generally 
occurs in the context of expensive patent litigation in the courtS.235 
Therefore, to reduce the cost of ex post delineation, a new 
administrative procedure should be established in which the USPTO 
can more cheaply clarify patent claims?36 Such a new procedure is 
necessary because the two existing ex post administrative 
proceedings, reexamination and reissuance proceedings/37 do not 
provide opportunities for clarifying patent scope. Reexamination 
proceedings, which allow the USPTO to reconsider the validity of a 
patent in light of the state of the art prior to the alleged invention,238 
typically involve some prior art reference that was not considered 
231. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
232. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
233. Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 503 F.3d 1352, 1360-62 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
234. See, e.g., id. (finding a patent invalid for failing to satisfy the enablement requirement 
where the patent owner advocated for a narrower and fully enabled claim construction). 
235. See supra notes 186-187 and accompanying text. 
236. Cf BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 241-42 (proposing that the USPTO provide 
an "opinion letter" regarding patent infringement). 
237. See supra notes 186-188 and accompanying text. 
238. 35 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). 
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before the patent issued.239 Given their focus on validity in light of a 
prior art reference, reexaminations provide no meaningful opportunity 
for simply clarifying a patent's scope. Similarly, reissue proceedings 
only allow for the correction of patents that are "wholly or partially 
inoperative or invalid, by reason of a defective specification or 
drawing or by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he 
had a right to claim in the patent.,,240 Reissue proceedings are thus 
limited to correcting mistakes and would not support clarification of 
patent scope that, through no mistake, was inchoate and uncertain. 
Reissue proceedings, however, could be expanded to include 
"clarifying reissue proceedings" that would allow for clarification 
regarding the meaning of words and phrases in patent claims.241 Such 
proceedings would involve the review and reissue of patents with 
additional information that more clearly describes the scope of patent 
protection. Third-parties should be given meaningful adversarial 
rights because their involvement could help identify where and how 
the patent needs clarification and because such a meaningful role 
ensures the fairness of binding them to the clarification in later 
litigation concerning the patent, if any arises.242 The patent examiner 
would be able to ensure that reissued claims clearly address the 
factual scenarios raised by third parties and patentees, thereby 
addressing indeterminacies of fact and aim in the patents scope.243 
Most importantly, clarifying reissue proceedings would be 
cheaper than judicial claim construction in two respects. First, the 
USPTO has technical expertise that may facilitate efficient 
clarification.244 For example, examiners can use that expertise to 
identify and understand which details of patent scope have already 
been delineated ex ante, which details therefore need further ex post 
clarification, and any relationships between the specified and 
unspecified details. Second, clarifying reissue proceedings would 
239. See 35 U.S.C. § 303 (2000). 
240. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). 
24l. Administrative proceedings for clarifying patent scope could also be developed 
separately from current reissue proceedings, but leveraging existing administrative procedures 
might facilitate the creation of new procedures. Apart from the details sketched below, a 
complete discussion of the procedures for conducting clarifying reissue proceedings is beyond 
the scope of this article. 
242. See infra note 246 and accompanying text. Reexamination proceedings currently 
allow for third party involvement. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-18 (2000). 
243. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 74, at 50 (noting that "[Ilawyers propose 
interpretations of claims with an eye toward the outcome they will produce"). 
244. See PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2008); 
Paltex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594,602 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
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focus only on claim construction and therefore would be cheaper than 
ex post clarification through litigation?45 Judicial claim construction 
typically involves numerous other sources of expense, including 
discovery regarding all issues in a patent infringement case, even 
issues that are not directly related to claim construction, such as 
validity, equitable considerations relating to the enforceability of the 
patent, the details of an accused product or method, and 
counterclaims.246 Because many patent suits settle after claim 
construction, clarifying reissue proceedings should prevent many 
patent infringement suits from ever being filed. In addition, even if a 
clarified reissue patent is later the subject of patent litigation, the cost 
of adding those clarifications would not be incurred a second time 
during the litigation. When a patent is reissued, the original, 
unclarified patent is "surrender[ ed],,,247 and only the clarified reissued 
patent claims could be asserted in subsequent litigation?48 
Some aspects of reissue proceedings are already well-suited to 
reducing patent-scope uncertainty. For example, patentees are 
prevented in current reissue proceedings from "recapturing" material 
disclaimed during prosecution249 and from introducing new subject 
matter into the patent.250 Clarifying reissue proceedings would 
likewise prohibit the patentee from changing the scope of the patent 
through recapture or expansion by way of adding new subject matter. 
Clarifying reissue proceedings would only provide an opportunity for 
refining uncertain scope, not changing that scope altogether. 
245. Similarly, reexamination proceedings are designed to "settle validity disputes more 
quickly and less expensively than the often protracted litigation involved in such cases." Paltex 
Corp., 758 F.2d at 602; see also Alan Devlin, Revisiting the Presumption of Patent Validity, 37 
Sw. U. L. REv. 323, 360 (2008) (stating that reexamination proceedings address validity more 
cheaply and efficiently than litigation). 
246. See, e.g., Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(deciding an appeal in a patent infringement case of issues related to claim construction, 
infringement, validity, inequitable conduct, and antitrust counterclaims). Some of these 
discovery costs might be avoided if judicial proceedings were bifurcated to allow for early 
resolution of claim construction issues. 
247. 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000). 
248. ClarifYing reissue proceedings would not bar litigants from later disputing the scope 
of the patent claims as clarified. Burk & Lemley, supra note 74, at 50. In a later claim 
construction dispute, however, a court would not repeat the administrative clarification. For 
example, a litigant would not be able to assert a claim construction that directly conflicted with 
the administrative clarifications. As with normal reissue proceedings, the court would accept as 
a starting point the clarified claims as if they were the claims that originally issued in the patent. 
See 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000) (noting that reissue patents have the same "effect and operation of 
law ... as if the same had been originally granted in such amended form). 
249. See Mentor Corp. v. Coloplast, Inc., 998 F.2d 992, 995 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
250. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). 
2009] IMPORTANCE OF EX POST PATENT DEUNATION 371 
The effect of clarifying reissue proceedings should differ from 
normal reissue proceedings in at least one important respect; normal 
reissue proceedings can give rise to "intervening rights," but 
clarifying reissue proceedings should not. Normal reissue proceedings 
may broaden patent rights beyond the scope of the original patent. 251 
However, because "the public has a right to use what is not 
specifically claimed in the original patents,,,252 third parties cannot be 
liable for activities that occurred before reissuance and infringe the 
reissued patent but not the original patent.253 The public has such 
"intervening rights" during the time period from the date the original 
patent issued and the date the patent was reissued. Similar to 
broadening reissue proceedings, some clarifying reissue proceedings 
might reject a narrower clarification in favor of a broader one. Such a 
selection should not create "intervening rights," however, because 
clarifying reissue would only make patent scope clearer, not change 
it.254 Because patent infringement is a strict liability offense, the 
inability of a third party to know the detailed scope of the patent 
before clarifying reissuance should not create any temporary 
exemption from liability for damages.255 
V. CONCLUSION 
To serve the constitutional goal of patent law, "promot[ing] the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts,,,256 patent scope should be 
tailored to the patentee's inventive contribution, and should not 
restrain others from undertaking activities that are different from the 
patentee's invention. Frequently, however, inherent limitations 
undermine the capacity of words to capture and accurately convey the 
scope of the invention. Patent claims communicate for generally-
accepted prototypical examples whether a factual scenario falls within 
251. Current reissue proceedings allow a patentee to "enlarge[ e 1 the scope of the claims," 
provided that the proceedings commence within two years of the patent issuing. 35 U.S.C. § 251 
(2000). 
252. Seattle Box Co. v. Indus. Crating & Packing, Inc., 756 F.2d 1574, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 
1985). 
253. 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000). Courts may also grant third parties limited rights extending 
beyond reissuance on the basis of equity. 
254. Clarifying reissue proceedings would merely elucidate and not change the scope of 
the patent. For this reason, the two-year limitation on broadening reissue would also not apply to 
clarifying reissue. Indeed, such a temporal limitation would be problematic since disputes 
regarding patent scope may not arise until more than two years after issuance. 
255. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007). See supra note 
223 and accompanying text. 
256. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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the protected contours of a patent.257 Beyond the limited confines of 
agreed prototypes, the meanings of the tenns in patent claims can, and 
to some degree must, be unclear. In addition, in order to capture the 
full scope of the invention, patent scope typically must be broadened 
beyond the original embodiment underlying the discovery. Even if 
this broadening is explicit, broad tenninology exacerbates 
uncertainty. Unifonnly requiring increased investment in ex ante 
delineation is wasteful because the vast majority of patents yield no 
revenue. 258 Thus, because of the inherent limitations of language and 
difficulties in foreseeing and describing all of the factual scenarios 
that might infringe a patent, clarifying ex post whether a patent's 
scope encompasses one particular factual scenario is likely to be more 
efficient than increased ex ante efforts.259 
Many courts and commentators, however, present the 
uncertainty in claim construction as a breakdown in claim drafting or 
patent law, contending that claim construction should merely 
elucidate boundaries that were fully established ex ante. Certainly, 
some of the uncertainty in the scope of patent rights might be 
addressed through more explicit claim drafting or a more detailed 
specification.26o Nevertheless, claim construction is at times the 
necessary last step in defining the scope of patents, not merely a 
mechanism for resolving disputes regarding rights of pre-detennined 
scope.261 Ex ante and ex post delineation therefore must be balanced 
257. Solan, supra note 72, at 262 ("Our ability to apply ... rules [of interpretation] so 
easily is what gives us some semblance of a rule of law. "). See also id. at 264. 
258. Some proposals for clarifying ex ante patent scope do not apply uniformly to all 
patents, and thus may not suffer from some of the efficiency concerns noted above. For 
example, some commentators have suggested that software patents should be granted sparingly 
because their boundaries are too difficult to delineate ex ante. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, 
at 152, 243-44, 260. The USPTO has begun a pilot program that allows third parties to submit 
prior art relevant to certain pending patent applications. See Peer-Reviewed Prior Art Pilot, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/peerpriorartpilot/ (last visited Nov. II, 2008). That prior art 
may help the examiner clarify the scope of an issued patent. These proposals, however, have 
limited impact on the need for ex post clarification because, by virtue of their limited 
application, these proposals do not impact a large number of patents. 
259. HART, supra note 12, at 127 (noting that "something in the nature of a choice 
between open alternatives must be made by whoever is to resolve them" in order to address 
uncertainty regarding the scope of open-textured phrases). 
260. See Mullally, supra note 9, at 370. 
261. See Lemley, supra note 162, at 1522 ("On this view, the fact that accused infringers 
have to pay some of the cost of determining validity is not a bug in the system, but a feature."). 
Indeed, the need for additional decisions regarding patent scope-the exercise of a discretionary 
choice between numerous options-may help to explain why the Federal Circuit alters district 
court claim constructions in more than a third of all patent appeals. The Federal Circuit's 
choices may simply differ from those of district courts. 
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to promote efficiency. Courts should recognize the importance of ex 
post delineation of claims by adjusting certain patent law doctrines 
that are grounded on the incorrect assumption that patents 
communicate with virtual certainty patent scope ex ante.262 Moreover, 
because the need for ex post delineation cannot be eliminated, it 
would be more efficient to adopt a new, relatively inexpensive 
administrative procedure to clarify claim scope without incurring the 
costs of full-blown patent litigation. 
262. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 74, at 55 (discussing revisions to patent law doctrines 
based on the notice of patent scope provided ex ante by patents). 
* * * 
